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Preface
Most of the chapters in this thesis have already appeared as articles. Chapter 2 is a
revised version of Beetsma (1991). Chapter 3 appeared as Beetsma (1992). Chapters 4 and 5
originate from Beetsma and van der Ploeg (1992a). Finally, chapter 6 is a revised version of
Beetsma and van der Ploeg (1992b).
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
This thesis consists of two parts. In part A, chapters 2 to 5, exchange rate bands will be
analysed, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. As far as the empirical work is
concerned, the focus is on exchange rates in the European Monetary System (EMS), which is
one of the most successful and well-documented examples of an exchange rate band system in
practice, while, as far as the theoretical work is concerned, the emphasis is on the effects of
exchange rate bands on macro-economic stabilisation. Part B, chapter 6, investigates the
relationship between inflation and inequality from a politico-economic point of view.
1. Introduction to part A
1.1. The EMS and other systems of managed exchange rates
The dominant system of managed exchange rates in the first decades after the Second
World War was the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, in which most
of the industrialised countries participated. In 1973 the last members left the system, which had
become unsustainable by then. Already in April 1972, the six EEC-members, plus three
members-in-waiting (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom), agreed on the so-called
'Snake' to limit the fluctuations of the exchange rates between their currencies. However, over
the course of the seventies this system also eroded significantly. After a prolonged period
without intervention and strong appreciation of the dollar, which resulted in serious trade deficits
of the United States, the Group of Five (the five largest industrial countries) agreed upon
devaluation of the dollar at the Plaza Meeting in September 1985. Since then the dollar
continued to depreciate until it was stabilised after the Louvre Accord in February 1987.
Funabashi (1988) describes this episode in detail. Since the end of the seventies, the Nordic
countries, Norway, Sweden and Finland, have been trying to target their currencies against a
weighted basket of the currencies of their main trading partners. Finally, the EMS, being build
on the foundations laid by the Snake agreement, started to function in March 1979. Because of
its institutional set-up and its (unexpected) success, it provides a prima facie example for testing
exchange rate band models, as will be done extensively in this thesis.
In particular in the first years there were significant disparities among the economic
policies of the participants, with unsustainable divergences of inflation, which resulted in
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frequent realignments. However, after the realignment of March 1983, France shifted away from
its policy of budgetary stimulation. Since then, devaluations became rare, while, after January
1987 until very recently, no realignments occurred.' The perceived success of the system during
this period, led to more concrete plans for the realisation of a European Monetary Union (EMU)
by the Delors Committee (1989). Important questions were raised, such as the institutional set-up
and status of a European central bank and the speed at which the transition to an EMU should
take place. Other problems of such a transition, which could have been addressed within the
context of the literature on exchange rate bands, are the amount of reserves needed by the
central banks and the trade-off between exchange rate variability and interest rate variability (see
Svensson, 1991a), when the fluctuation margins of the exchange rates are reduced.
The progress of monetary integration culminated in the Maastricht Treaty in December
1991, in which, among other things, the time-schedule for the transition to an EMU and the
conditions for admission into this system were laid down. By then, already, the progress of
monetary unification had weakened. Under the threat of inflation caused by the German
unification, the Bundesbank raised interest rates, which had to be followed by the other EMS
participants in order to avoid devaluation of their currencies. Furthermore, the criteria for
admission to the EMU, as specified in the Maastricht Treaty raised serious doubts about the
eligibility of some countries to participate in the EMU. Subsequently, the difficulties in the
ratification process of the Treaty (witness the Danish rejection and the French referendum) were
obviously too much for a number a central banks to knock down the massive speculations
against their currencies. The British pound and the Italian lira, which had suffered from yeats of
overvaluation, were forced to leave the system in September 1992. Within a few months time
after that, the Spanish peseta, the Portugese escudo and the Irish punt have been devalued, while
the French franc and the Danish kroner have been under have speculative pressure for some
time.
1.2. Why managing exchange rates?
An obvious question, which might have become relevant again with the recent
developments in the EMS, is why one would want to have bands on the exchange rate or, more
generally, why one would want to manage exchange rates at all. Despite its long history, the
debate about the desirability of exchange rate management is still open both for policymakers
and academics.
' The only change in this period occurred in January 1990, when the band on the Italian lira was
reduced from tóo~o to }2.25"~0.
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One of the main arguments in favour of flexible exchange rates is that they make it
easier for economies to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Exchange rates can move fast in response
to disequilibria and adjustment via a change in the exchange rate means that less, maybe more
costly, adjustment is needed elsewhere in the economy. However, there is ample evidence that
nominal exchange rates do not respond to deviations from purchasing power parity, at least not
in the short run. For example, Mussa (1986), documents a positive correlation between nominal
and real exchange rates for a broad group of countries. The correlation is stronger for more
flexible nominal exchange rate regimes.
Broadly speaking, the advocates of managed exchange rates fall into two camps (see
Williamson, 1993). One group regards a commitment to a fixed exchange rate as providing a
nominal anchor for the economy. This philosophy may have nurtured the attemps to suppress
realignments in the EMS after January 1987. The other group regards exchange rate management
as a device against destabilising speculation or erratic movements of nominal exchange rates
from their equilibrium values. Williamson, therefore, argues that exchange rate management
should be directed at targeting the real exchange rate around some fundamental equilibrium level
(which is partly determined by purchasing power parity considerations; see also Williamson,
1985) and, in order to prevent speculative runs, providing enough flexibility to shift the target
zone if this is required by changes in the equilibrium level. From this point of view, it was the
wrong policy to defend the pound Sterling and the halian lira against a realignment, because
they had deviated too far from their purchasing power parities.
This view, however, denies the role of the EMS as a disciplinary device (cf Giavazzi
and Pagano, 1988) on policymakers to keep inflation under control. By hanging their political
prestige on avoiding devaluations against the Deutsche Mark, policymakers enhance the
credibility of their commitment to the exchange rate band. A credible commitment to targeting
one's own currency to a strong currency implies low money growth, low inflation and therefore
moderate wage claims. The net result is the absence of a wage-price spiral with its distortionary
losses. Therefore, a relevant question in taking a position between the two views is whether
inflation differentials, which are a major determinant of the 'fundamental equilibrium exchange
rate', are an endogenous phenomenon (a self-fulfilling wage-price spiral) or whether they are
caused by asymmetric exogenous developments or by structural deficiencies in the economic
system, such as an underdeveloped tax system. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to pursue this question in greater detail.
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1.3. Modeling exchange rate bands
To highlight how chapters 2 to 5 fit within a more general picture, a very short overview
is given of the literature on exchange rate bands. For a more complete overview, the reader is
referred to Svensson (1992c), who assesses the ability of these models to explain the empirically
observed behaviour of exchange rates in bands, and Bertola (1993), who provides a more general
theoretical survey of continuous-time interven[ion models.
There are several reasons for modeling exchange rate behaviour in a band explicitly,
rather than treating the exchange rate as being completely fixed. In the first place, it is not clear
for which bandwidth it is still safe to model the exchange rate as being fixed. Of course, the
answer depends on the underlying problem that is being investigated. Secondly, by allowing for
an explicit role of the band, one might address a number of interesting issues, which otherwise
would be very difficult to investigate, concerning, for example, the optimal width of the band,
optimal intervention policy inside the band, the transition from a band on the exchange rate to a
fixed exchange rate, the relationship between the position in the band and the danger of a
realignment, and predictabiliry of exchange rate changes based on past behaviour in the band.
Explicit modeling of exchange rate bands originates from the literature on target zones,
which were originally proposed as a zones for real exchange rates, in order to avoid that
destabilising speculation would cause too large disparities of real exchange rates from their
fundamental equilibrium values (Williamson, 1985; Krugman and Miller, 1992). Interventions
are supposed to take place only at the boundaries of the target zone. Krugman (1991) was the
first to develop a formal model of exchange rate behaviour in a target zone. In his standard
target zone model, it is however the nominal exchange rate, rather than the real exchange rate,
which is kept in a band by interventions at the boundaries. The main result is that, even without
intervention now, the exchange rate is stabilised by the prospect of future interventions at the
boundaries.
The theoretical implications of the standard model have been worked out in detail.
Svensson (1991a) studies interest rate differentials at infinitesimal maturity and shows that there
is a trade-off between the instantaneous variabilities of [he exchange rate and the interest rate
differential. Thus, if the width of the exchange rate band goes to zero, then the instantaneous
interest rate differential variability gces to a positive limít. For narrow bands the asymptotic
variability of the interest rate differential increases in the width, while for wide bands the
asymptotic variabiliry decreases in the width. Svensson (1991a) also shows that, if the
fundamental is a regulated Brownian motion without drift, then the unconditional exchange rate
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distribution in the band must be U-shaped, i.e. most of the probability mass is concentrated at
the edges of the band.
Although the standard model captures important institutional features of the EMS system
(and other exchange rate band systems as well), there has been little empirical support for the
model. Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991) find no evidence of the specific type of non-linearity
in the relationship between fundamental and exchange rate as predicted by the model. Instead of
being U-shaped, the empirical distributions of the exchange rates in the band are more like a
hump-shape, with little probability mass concentrated at the edges of the band. Bertola and
Caballero (1992) offer an explanation for this observation by extending the model to allow for
repeated realignments. The standard model also predicts a non-stochastic negative relationship
between the interest rate differential and the exchange rate, indicating that the exchange rate is
expected to move towards the central parity over time (in absence of drift in the fundamental).
However, in reality, the data often show a lot of noise in the relationship between interest rate
differential and exchange rate position in the band, together with expectations of further
deviations from central parity. Svensson (1991a,b), therefore, extends the standard model to
allow for constant realignment risk, while Bertola and Svensson (1990) and Lindberg and
Sóderlind (1992) incorporate stochastic devaluation risk.
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) show that the standard model can be derived from a simple
monetary model assuming purchasing power parity. This assumption has been widely rejected in
the literature. It implies that output is at full employment level, and the real exchange rate is
fixed. Miller and Weller (1990, 1991), therefore, extend the standard model to a stochastic
Dombusch (1976) overshooting model, which allows them to study the effects of bands on the
real exchange rate as well.
1.4. Abstract ofpart A
In chapters 2, 3 and 4, we try to contribute to the explanation of the behaviour of EMS
exchange rates in their bands. In chapter 2, we compare three target zone models in their ability
to account for some stylised statistical properties of EMS exchange rates. For all cases, the
exchange rate can be derived from the same underlying structural model, assuming purchasing
power parity and uncovered interest parity. The models differ, however, in the way in which
interventions take place. In chapter 3, a more 'eclectic' view is taken, and expected changes of
EMS exchange rates in their bands are estimated, while the regression analysis is based on major
qualitative predictions of the literature on exchange rate bands, without taking a stand on the
underlying structural model. Also, the validity of the uncovered interest parity assumption is
addressed by estimating risk premium models. In chapter 4, we relax the purchasing power
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pazity assumption and follow Miller and Weller (1990) by using a stochastic Dornbusch (1976)
overshooting model to study unconditional distributions of exchange rates in their bands. We
extend their model to allow for intramarginal interventions as well. Chapter 5 uses the same
model as in chapter 4 to compare variances of output, prices, interest rates and nominal and real
exchange rates under a nominal exchange rate band with corresponding variances under other
exchange rate regimes. This chapter also deals with question of the optimal width of the
exchange rate band from the viewpoint of macroeconomic policy stabilisation.
In chapter 2 a Monte Carlo analysis is used to compare three target zone models in their
ability to reproduce some stylised facts of weekly Deutsche Mark exchange rates in the EMS
from January 1987 till August 1990. The models are Krugman's (1991) basic tazget zone model
and two extensions: a model of infra- cum intramarginal interventions and a model of unfulfilled
realignment expectations. Compared with the corresponding dollar rates, returns on Deutsche
Mark rates exhibit much more non-normality, which can be generated endogenously by the latter
two models, and slightly more conditional heteroskedasticity, which can be produced
simultaneously by the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model. Another, tentative, but also
more general, conclusion arises from this exer~cise, namely that the broad consensus about the
limited usefulness of the first generation of target zone models to describe EMS exchange rate
behaviour might have been caused by the emphasis that has been put on detecting specific
non-linear relationships between fundamental and exchange rate. A slightly more complicated
intervention policy than that of the standard model can be consistent with a large variety of non-
linearities in the relationship between fundamental and exchange rate. Therefore, rather than
searching for specific non-linearities (e.g., see Flood, Rose and Mathieson, 1991), it seems more
useful to investigate the appropriateness of exchange rate band models by comparing their
statistical implications under different polrcy assumptions with what is found in the data.
As already mentioned earlier, chapter 3 takes a more 'eclectic' approach. It follows Rose
and Svensson (1991), Svensson (1991) and Lindberg, Svensson and Sóderlind (1991) in
estimating expected rates of depreciation within the curtency bands of the French franc and the
Italian lira against the Deutsche Mark, both unconditional and conditional upon no realignment.
The existing literature is extended in two ways. First, more elaborate specifications are used in
the regression analysis. Secondly, the uncovered interest parity assumption is relaxed and models
for risk premia are estimated as well. Using estimates of the expected rates of depreciation
within the band and estimates of the risk premia, one can construct estimates for the expected
rate of depreciation, the expected rate of realignment and the expected rate of devaluation of
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these exchange rates during their EMS period by appropriate adjustment of interest differentials.
These adjustments turn out to be of non-trivial magnitude.
Bertola and Caballero (1992) provide evidence of an empirical puzzle for EMS exchange
rates, namely that their distributions within the band tend to be hump-shaped rather than U-
shaped, as predicted by the standard target zone model. Their sample period is April 1979 -
December 1987. During this period, realignments occurred frequently, so that their explanation is
based on an extension of the standard model for repeated realignments. In chapter 4 we provide
evidence that the empirical puzzle continues to hold after the realignment in January 1987,
despite the fact that interest rate differentials with Germany have decreased dramatically. [n
particular, this is the case for the Dutch guilder. We provide an alternative explanation within
the context of a model which has two additional 'elements of realism' when compared with most
other models of exchange rate bands, namely sluggish wages and prices and intramarginal
interventions. Both these 'elements of realism' are necessary for the explanation, which is based
on the mean-reversion in the fundamental combined with the shape of the time-invariant
relationship between exchange rate and fundamental.
Chapter 5 uses the model of chapter 4 to study unconditional variances of output, prices,
exchange rates and interest rates under a variety of exchange rate regimes. In particulaz, we
compare variances under a nominal exchange rate band with variances under an unrestricted
dirty float. In addition, we address an issue which has been relatively underexplored in the
literature, namely that of the welfare effects of exchange rate bands, by investigating the optimal
trade-off between output variability and consumer price variability. Thus, the problem consists of
jointly choosing the width of the exchange rate band and the degree of intramarginal
accommodation. An unrestricted dirty float is the limiting case when the bandwidth goes to
infinity. In a first-best world, the question of the optimal bandwidth is still unsolved, although,
so far, Monte Carlo simulations have not shown a case for a finite band, which corresponds to a
piece-wise linear money supply rule. However, in a second-best world, in which authorities are
restricted to a particular (for example, zero) degree of intramarginal monetary accommodation, a
finite band on the exchange rate may be preferred to a dirty float, depending on the relative
weight attached to consumer price variability.
2. Introduction to part B
Part B, chapter 6, investigates a potential link between inequality and inflation. In a
democratic society with a large fraction of poor people, political parties are elected that are
likely to represent the interests of the poor. Therefore, the more unequally nominal government
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debt holdings are distributed across the population, the stronger the incentive for the govemment
to levy unanticipated inflation taxes in order to erode the real value of the debt holdings and to
redistribute from the rich to the poor. Consequently, inequality and high levels of nominal
govemment debt sow the seeds for high inflation.
This theoretical link between inequality and inflation may complement other recent
theories of inflation. Cukierman et al. (1992) test a political model of tax reform on a cross-
section of countries and find that political instability is positively associated with inflation.
Another theory, which may be more appropriate to explain temporary outbursts of high inflation
is the theory of "populist policy cycles", a typical Latin American way of policymaking, where
deep inequality and social unrest sow the seeds for policies of redistribution and expansion by
reactivation. In the longer run, when the economies run into bottlenecks and foreign reserves are
depleted, these policies become unsustainable and inflation explodes (e.g., Sachs, ]989;
Dombusch and Edwards, 1989).
These theories may be more appropriate for explaining differences in inflation among
non-democracies, because these countries show much larger variations in the degree of
polarisation of their societies and the degree of political instability. They seem, however, less
appropriate to account for differences in inflationary experience among democracies.
Regressing average inflation over a number of years on (income) inequality for a cross-
section of over twenty democracies, we find indeed a significantly positive relation between
(income) inequality and inflation, while for a group of over fourty non-democracies not the
slightest indication of any relation between inflation and inequality is found. The positive
relation between inflation and inequality for democracies is unaffected when we add proxies for
policitical instability and political polarisation to the regression equation. Furthermore, we find
no evidence of reverse causation, i.e. of inflation afiecting inequality.
Although nominal govemment debt is the only nominal asset in the model, the incentive
for inflation is of course present for any type of nominal asset which is unequally distributed
across the population. Moreover, íf one allows for overlapping generations, then a society which
is dominated by young people will be more likely to elect political parties that aze in favour of
taxing the elderly by eroding the real value of their return on accumulated savings and lowering
taxes for the population at large. The argument of the model can also be extended for non-
democracies. Populist dictatorships are more likely to serve the interests of the poor and to
induce high inflation, while a capitalist dictatorship is more likely to represent the interests of





Bands and Statistical Properties of EMS Exchange Rates:
A Monte Carlo Investigation Of Three Target Zone Models
1. Introduction
Although the European Monetary System (EMS) has been studied extensively (e.g., see
Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989), until recently only little effort has been paid to explicit
modeling of the effects of the exchange rate bands. Since the introduction of the basic target
zone model by Krugman (1991), a literature has emerged which extends the model in trying to
explain the behaviour of exchange rates in such currency bands. The empirical evidence for the
EMS of this simplest target zone model is not very supportive. For example, using
nonparametric regression techniques, Meese and Rose (1990) find no significant evidence of
nonlinearities linking fundamentals to EMS exchange rates in the way predicted by the Krugman
model. A similar conclusion is reached in a more elaborate investigation by Flood, Rose and
Mathieson (1991). However, although estimates by de Jong (1991) of the Krugman model on
EMS exchange rates for the period 1987-1990 show that it is difficult to identify the interest
semi-elasticíty, which causes the nonlinearity of the exchange rate solution, tests of the
hypothesis that the parameter is zero, reject for the Deutsche Mark against the Belgian franc, the
French franc and the Danish kroner.
In this chapter we present some stylised facts of weekly bilateral Deutsche Mark
exchange rates in the EMS for the period 1987-1990. In particular, we compare the results of
tests against unit roots, non-normality and conditional heteroskedasticity with the corresponding
test results for dollar exchange rates against EMS currencies over the same period, in order to
detect effects that might have been caused by the presence of the currency bands in the EMS.
Reasons for looking at these test statistics, are that they have been documented extensively in the
empirical exchange rate literature (e.g., see Baillie and McMahon, 1989) and that they show
clear-cut patterns for the exchange rates under consideration, hence they may be informative
about the potential appropriateness of the models we consider. We find that in all cases it is
difficult to reject the unit root hypothesis. However, compared to the dollar rates, retums on
Deutsche Mark rates show much more non-normality and slightly more conditional
heteroskedasticity.
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We use three target zone models to try and explain these facts. The first one is the
Krugman model, which is mainly used as a standard for comparison. Although the empirical
evidence is not in support of this model, the other two models, which are extensions of it, imply
a more flexibte functional relationship between the fundamental and the exchange rate, which
has not been tested formally on EMS exchange rates. More importantly, they assume a richer
description of exchange rate band policy and thus introduce richer dynamics in the exchange rate
behaviour. Since two of the three models assume the absence of realignments, our sample period
is from 1987 until 1990, because during this period no major realignments have occurred in the
EMS.
The Krugman model assumes a fully credible exchange rate band and, because it links
the exchange rate in a nonlinear way to the economic fundamental, it is able to generate non-
normality and conditional heteroskedasticity endogenously. However, the amount of non-
normality generated by the model is less than what is found in the data. Therefore, we consider
two extensions of the model, which draw from additional sources of non-normality. While the
basic Krugman model only allows for interventions at the margins of the exchange rate band
(inframarginal interventions), our first extension is a model (henceforth to be called 'the infra-
cum intramarginal interventions model'), in which inframarginal interventions are combined with
interventions inside the band (intramarginal inierventions), where the latter are modeled as
proposed by Lewis (1990). An alternative way of combining infra- and intramarginal
interventions has been proposed by Lindberg and Sóderlind (1992), who introduce a variable
drift parameter to capture the increasing intervention activity when the exchange rate drifts too
far away from its central parity. Estimates of the model on Swedish data show that this
parameter is significant. Combination of infra- and intramarginal interventions might also give a
more realistic description of exchange rate management in the EMS (e.g., see Giavazzi and
Giovannini, 1989), especially since the Basle-Nyborg agreement in September 1987, when the
facilities for intramarginal interventions were extended. The other extension of the Krugman
model is the model proposed by Bertola and Caballero (1992). It abandons the assumption of
full credibility, and allows for repeated realignments of the exchange rate band. Although
realignments have not occurred during the period under consideration, there might have been
(unfulfilled) expectations of realignments, because there was (and still is) an option [o realign the
central parities (see Delors Committee, 1989). These expectations could have influenced the
behaviour of the exchange rate in its band. Absence of full credibility causes the exchange rate
to jump when it reaches its margins and the band is defended. This effect reproduces the strong
non-normality which is found in the exchange rate retums.
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Direct estimation of even the basic Krugman model is complicated. De Jong (1991)
estimates the model by maximum likelihood, which is computationally demanding. Although one
can obtain the conditional density of the exchange rate for this model (see Svensson, (19916),
for its extensions conditional densities are not available. Therefore, we do not consider direct
estimation in this chapter, but we take a less ambitious approach, and investigate which model is
best able to reproduce the stylised facts found in the data. The distributions of the statistics for
unit root tests, normality tests and conditional heteroskedasticity tests are unknown. Hence, we
use Monte Carlo simulations to obtain the means of the desired test statistics over simulated
exchange rate series, and we compare their magnitudes with those found for the data. An
extensive search over the parameter space shows that the models are indeed able to reproduce
stylised facts for reasonable parameter values. Tests of the unit root hypothesis on series
generated by the Krugman model do not reject at conventional significance levels, which must
be due to the low power of the tests since the model predicts the exchange rate to be stationary,
but which is in accordance with the empirical findings. This model also generates moderate non-
normality in the exchange rate retums. Much stronger rejections of normality are found for the
series drawn with the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model and the Ber[ola and
Caballero (1992) model (where we condition on the absence of realignments in the simulated
series, since no realignments have occurred during our sample period). In the latter model, the
jumps in the exchange rate are responsible for the high kurtosis, while for the other model it is
the presence of intramarginal interventions, which are modeled to become more frequent when
the exchange rate drifts too far from its central parity, that produces the strong non-normality.
Also, this model is able to produce a strong rejection of conditional homoskedasticity at the
same time. In the Bertola and Caballero model, however, the occasional jumps in the exchange
rate mitigate the persistence in volatility, which was found for a few of the Deutsche Mark
retums series. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that for some of the Deutsche Mark
exchange rate series during recent years (e.g., the Deutsche Mark vis-à-vis the French franc) the
Bertola and Caballero model might be more appropriate, while for other series (e.g., the
Deutsche Mark vis-à-vis the Irish punt) the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model seems
to give a better explanation of the stylised facts.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 1 we summarise stylised
facts of the weekly Deutsche Mark rates for the period after the realignment of January 1987,
and we compare these facts with what is found for the corresponding dollar rates. Section 2
gives a short presentation of the three models under consideration. [n section 3 the set-up of the
Monte Carlo experiment and the results of a search over the relevant part of the parameter space
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are discussed. Furthennore, effects of changes in parameter values are analysed. We distinguish
between parameter changes which affect the exchange rate solution, parameter changes which
affect the uncontrollable part of the fundamental and, for the extensions of the Krugman model,
changes in the policy parameters, which affect the controllable part of the fundamantal. Section
4 concludes. Details of the simulation procedure are given in the appendix.
2. Stylised facts of EMS exchange rates
In this section we present some stylised facts of weekly Deutsche Mark exchange rates
in the EMS for the period since the realignment in January 1987, and make a comparison with
what is found for U.S. dollar rates against EMS currencies over the same period, in order to
detect effects that might have been caused by the presence of the official bands on the Deutsche
Ytark rates.
The sample period is January 14, 1987 to August 22, 1990, which yields 189 Wednesday
observations. During this entire period, eight countries participated in the exchange rate
mechanism of the EMS. These countries are Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg,
Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. Because Belgium and Luxemburg maintain a fixed parity,
we exclude Luxemburg from our analysis. We use logarithms of exchange rates and changes in
the logarithms as approximations to the exchange rate returns.
Key statistics of the Deutsche Mark and the dollar rates are summarised in Tables I and
2 respectively. In accordance with the overwhelming evidence in the literature (e.g., see Baillie
and Bollerslev, 1989a,b and Baillie and McMahon, 1989), in none of the cases the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (for critical values, see Fuller, 1976) is able to reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root in the exchange rates, although for the Deutsche Mark rates the results tend to be less
insignificant than for the dollar rates. Note that in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity
or autocon-elation, a Phillips-Perron (1988) test is more appropriate to test for unit roots.
A comparison of skewness, kurtosis and tests for non-norrnality reported in Tables I and
2, shows important differences for the returns on Deutsche Mark rates and the returns on dollar
rates. While for the dollar rates in none of the cases normality is rejected, we find for the
Deutsche Mark rates highly significant Jarque-Bera tests (e.g., see Jarque and Bera, 1980) for
non-normality, which is mainly due to the strong excess kurtosis. The fact that this is found for
all Deutsche Mark rates but for none of the dollar rates, suggests that this might be explained by
the presence of the bands on the Deutsche Marlc rates. Differences between Deutsche Mark and
dollar retums are less clear if we compare the tests against the ARCH altemative. Evidence of
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Table 1: Summary statistics of Deutsche Mark exchange rates
Dm~F'fr DmlLira Drtt~Bfr DmlDkr DIWIP DMIDfl
parity (e) -1.210 -6.580 -3.027 - 1.339 0.985 -0.119
mean (De) x 10000 -0.36 -2.51 0.31 -0.53 0.34 0.05
stdev (4e) x 1000 2.03 3.30 1.13 2.19 1.77 0.57
skewness ( De) -2.25 -2.11 0.32 -0.70 -0.12 -0.97
kurtosis (~e) 17.14 12.07 5.04 5.55 6.59 5.83
BP(10) (De) 13.75 7.66 19.39 4.3I 9.26 7.07
ADF (e) -1.99 -2.19 -0.24 -1.60 -2.66 -2.32
1B (4e) 1768.11 804.12 37.71 68-97 105.62 95.70
ARCH(2) (4e) 0.49 0.21 3.08 1.40 634 28-22
Remarks:
I. Exchange rates have been calculated from closing rates of the guilder at the Amsterdam foreign exchange marke4 assuming
perfect crossarbitrage.
2. Exchange rates are expressed as the number of Deutsche Marks needed to buy one unit of foreign curtency.
3. The sample period runs from January 14, 1987 to August 22, 1990 (189 Wednesday observations).
4. The central parity is defined on the logarithm of the exchange rate.
5. Abbreviations: e- loglevel of exchange rate, 4e - first difference in loglevel, DM - Deutsche Mark, Ffr - French franc, Bfr -
Belgian franc, Dkr - Danish krone, IP - Irish pun4 DB - Dutch guilder, stdev - standard deviation, BP(10) - Box-Pierce test of
order 10 (under the null asymptotically chi-square distributed with IO degrees of freedom), ADF - augmented Dickey-Fuller test
including a constant, a time vend and two lags o( the differenced series, 1B - larque-Bera test for nortnaliry (under the null
arymptotically chi-square distributed with 2 degrees of frecdom) and ARCH(2) - ARCH test of order 2(under the null
asymplotically chi-square distributed with 2 degrees of freedom).
6. Significant [est statistics at a 5 ~ level are underlined.
Table 2: Summary statistics of dollar exchange rates
S~DM álFfr S~Lira á~Bfr á~Dkr á~IP álDtl
mean (De) x 10000 9.52 9.16 7.01 9.82 8.98 9.85 9.57
stdev (~e) x 100 1.44 1.36 1.32 1.42 1.41 1.37 I.43
skewness (4e) 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.064 0.1-3
kurtosis (~e) 2.99 3.11 2.99 3.08 3.09 2.91 2.96
BP(10) (~e) 12.64 12.76 11.47 13.36 12.85 13.90 12.80
ADF (e) -1.17 -0.86 -1.15 -0.90 -0.93 -0.98 -I.15
1B (4e) 0.79 0.53 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.16 0.62
ARCH(2) (4e) 2.05 1.46 3.17 2.19 2.21 0.64 2.38
Remarks:
1. See remarks 1.3,5 and 6, Table 1.
2. Exchange rates are expressed as the number of dollars needed to buy onc unit of foreign currency.
conditional heteroskedasticity is found for the Deutsche Mark against the Dutch guilder and the
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Irish pound. The absence of non-normality and conditional heteroskedasticity in the dollar
retums might seem to contradict evidence elsewhere in the literature (e.g., see Hsieh, 1988,
1989; Baillie and McMahon, 1989; and Baillie and Bollerslev, 19896). Note however that the
sample under consideration is rather short, and that the sampling frequency is weekly rather than
daily. Non-norrnality and conditional heteroskedasticity tend to disappear when the sample
frequency decreases (e.g., see Drost and Nijman, 1990).
3. The models
As shown in Section I, stylised facts of the Deutsche Mark exchange rates in the EMS
are that unit roots are difficult to reject and that the returns show much more non-norrnality than
retums on dollar exchange rates. In addition, for two series conditional heteroskedasticity was
found, while for the dollar rates in none of the cases conditional homoskedasticity was rejected.
We give a brief presentation of the models on which we base our Monte Carlo analysis in order
to try and explain these facts.
If one assumes purchasing power parity and uncovered interest parity, it is easy to derive
the following arbitrage equation ( e.g., see Krugman, 1991; or Svensson, 1991a) from a simple
monetary model of a small open economy or of two identical open economies:
e(t) - f(t) f a E, [de(t)]~dt , a~ 0, (1)
where e is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate expressed in terms of the number of units
of home currency needed to buy one unit of foreign currency, f is the fundamental and E, [.]
denotes the expectation conditional on all information available at time t. Parameter a is
interpreted as the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. For simplicity, we interpret (1) as
being derived from a model of a small open economy.
The fundamental is the sum of an uncontrollable component v(t), called velocity, which
is the accumulation of money demand shocks over time, and m(t), the (logarithm of) nominal
money supply, which is controlled by the monetary authorities. Velocity is assumed to evolve as
a Brownian motion with drift p and instantaneous standard deviation 6:
dv(t) - p dt } a dz(t), (2)
where z is a Wiener process with E[dz]-0 and E[(dz)Z]-dt.
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3.1. The Krugman (1991) model
The authorities keep the exchange rate in a fully credible band L, e], e~e, by imposing
a band L, fJ, f~f, on the fundamental. At its boundaries, this band is defended infinitesimally
small changes in the money supply,
dm(t) - dL(t) - dU(t), (3 )
where
dv(t), if f(t) - f and dv(t)~0,
dL(t) - -
0, otherwise,
-dv(t), if f(t) - f and dv(ty0,
and dU(t) -
Using Itó's lemma [e.g., see Harrison (1985)], one can solve for the exchange rate as a function
of the fundamental
e(f) - f t a p t Ai exp(~.i f) t AZ exp(~ f) , f~f~f, (4)
where l, and ~ are the solutions of (av'i2)~,Ztalt~.-1-Q and A, and AZ are uniquely determined
by the smooth pasting conditions. The exchange rate solution has the familiar S-shape (e.g., see
Krugman, 1991).
It is easy to show how exchange rate returns relate to the fundamental:
de(f) -[e'(f)lx t e"(f) a~12] dt t e'(f)6 dz(t). (5)
The instantaneous standard deviation of the change in the exchange rate, e'(fJQ, varies with the
position of the fundamental in the band. If the fundamental is close to its boundaries, then e'(f)
is smaller than when it is near its central parity. In the latter case, volatility of exchange rate
retums is higher than in the first case, which implies that retums are conditionally
heteroskedastic and that their unconditional distribution is not normal.
3.1. The infra- cum intramarginal interventions model
While the Krugman model only allows for interventions at the margins, the model that is
introduced now combines inframarginal interventions with intramarginal interventions, in the
way proposed by Lewis (1990). This might be a more realistic description of the EMS during
0, otherwise.
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recent years. Again, the authorities are assumed to defend a fully credible band [ f, f] on the
fundamental by interventions at the margins. However, when the fundamental is between its
boundaries, at each point in time and with some probability, the authorities prevent the
fundamental from changing its position. This intervention probability is assumed to increase with
the deviation of the exchange rate from its central parity, which can be motivated by a desire of
the authorities to stabilise the exchange rate in its band. This may help to increase the credibility
of the authorities' commitment to the exchange rate band.
As before, at the boundaries of the fundamental band, the authorities apply the regulators
as in (3), while, between the margins, the components of the fundamental change according to:
dv(t), with probability n(f),
dm(t) -
0, with probability [1 -n(f)],
(6)
where the central parity is normalised to zero for simplicity and where rz(f) lies between zero
and one. Hence, with probability n(f), the authorities intervene to counteract the velocity shocks.
Following Dixit (1991) and Lewis ( 1990), one can derive
e(f) - f t a[(l-a(fl)w -~'(~~] e'(f) t aa~(1-n(~) e„(~~2. (7)
Again, the smooth pasting conditions e'L) - e'(f) - 0 are applied to tie down a unique solution.
Notice that in absence of intramarginal interventions, n(f~Q the model reduces to the Krugman
model, while, if a(f) is a constant rz~0, the exchange rate solution as function of the fundamental
is the same as in the Krugman model, except that the driR and variance parameters are now
given by ( 1-n)p and ( 1-rz)6Zrespectively.
The probability of intervention is modeled as a logistic function of the absolute value of
the fundamental,
exp(botb~~f~)
n(f)- , if f~f~f, b~~0,
1 texP(bo}b,~f ~ ) -
(8)
In the Monte Carlo experiment, we shall restrict the fundamental band to be symmetric about
zero, i.e. f-f In that case the specification in (8) captures the notion that the frequency of
intervention increases when the fundamental (and therefore the exchange rate) deviates further
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from its central rate. We shall also choose bo small, so that the frequency of intervention is
negligible when the fundamental is at its central rate. With (8), one can solve (7) numerically.
3.3. The Bertola and Caballero (1992) model
The last model we consider is the Bertola and Caballero ( 1992) model of repeated
realignments. Although realignments have not occurred during our EMS sample period,
expectations of possible future realignments could have influenced the behaviour of EMS
exchange rates in their bands, in a way that might be captured by the Bertola and Caballero
model. Authorities impose a band [fff,f~tfJ on the fundamental, where f is the central rate of
the fundamental. When f is at one of its boundaries, the authorities have the choice between two
possible actions. One possibility is that the current band is defended, which takes place with
some probability 1-p, (1-pa), and the fundamental jumps back into the band from ftf (ftf) by
an amount R, (Ra). The other possible action, a realignment, which occurs with probability p,
(pa), is that the central parity is shifted downwards ( upwards) by an amount D, (Da) and the
fundamenta) is shifted to position K, ( Ka ) below (above) its new upper (lower) boundary. The
model assumes that the parameters p, , pa , R, , Rd , D, , Da , K, and Ka remain constant, so that,
apart from the shift in the central parity, the exchange rate solution will be the same before and
after a realignment or a defense of the band. Although neither have realignments in the EMS
always been of the same magnitude, nor have they always been undertaken when the exchange
rate was in the same position in the band, because of its flexibility, the model might still be a
reasonable description of exchange rate behaviour in the EMS during recent years.
The exchange rate solution has to fulfill
e(f; fo) - f f ap t A, exp(~., (f-fa )) t A~ exp(~.i ( f-fo )), (9)
where ~., and 1~ are again the solutions of (av212)~.2}ap~,-1-0, and A, and AZ follow from the
value-matching conditions
Pa e(fofDefftKa; fotDa) f(I-Pa) e(fotf-Ra; fa) - e(fo}f; fa),
(10)
P, e(foD,tf-K.; fo-D,) f(1-P,) e(fa}f}Ri; fo) - e(fotf; fo).
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4. Monte Carlo analysis
[n this section we investigate to what extent the target zone models presented in the
previous section are able to explain the stylised facts of the Deutsche Mark exchange rates,
especially when compared to the dollar exchange rates, hence to what extent these models are
able to account for the suggested effects of the bands on the Deutsche Mark rates. Therefore, the
question is whether there are parameter combinations for which the models under consideration
are able to (simultaneously) produce magnitudes of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the
Jarque-Bera test and the ARCH test that are comparible to those found for the data. We
emphasise however, that in theory none of the models implies a unit root or heteroskedasticity of
the parametric form specified by the ARCH model. Because the distributions of the test statistics
are unknown under any of the models, we simulate the exchange rate series from which we
compute the test statistics.
4.1. Monte Carlo set-up and choice oJparameter values
A band is imposed on the exchange rate which ranges from e--0.0225 to e-0.0225. This
corresponds to the t2.25o~o band on the majority of the EMS exchange rates. Given the
parametervalues, we then calculate the band on the fundamental. In order to be able to simulate
the models, one has to discretise them and adjust the parameter values to the frequency level at
which simulation takes place (for details, see the appendix). After a new value of the
fundamental is simulated, a simulated value of the exchange rate is obtained by using the
exchange rate solution which is given as a function of the fundamental ( in case of the infra- cum
intramarginal interventions model, we solve numerically for the exchange rate solution). To
make the simulated exchange rate series comparable to the data, we simulate them at a weekly
frequency IeveL However, because of the non-linearities induced by our particular types of
intervention policies, discretisation of the models at this frequency level will give poor
approximations of the continuous-time versions ( e.g., see Duffie and Singleton, 1988). Therefore,
we simulate the fundamental at roughly an hourly frequency level (in case of the infra- cum
intramarginal interventions model at a fifteen minute level, because of the high probability of
intervention when the fundamental drifts too far away from [he central parity), and compose
exchange rate series by recording the simulated fundamental at a weekly interval. Clearly,
simulation of the fundamental at a higher frequency level leads to a better approximation of the
exchange rate behaviour in the continuous-time versions of the models.
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To narrow down the set of possible parameter combinations over which we have to
search, we confine ourselves to combinations which result in symmetric exchange rate solutions,
so that p-0 for all models. With an exchange rate band of [-0.0225,0.0225], we then have that
the central rate of the fundamental and the exchange rate are both equal to zero. Asymmetry of
the exchange rate solution increases the skewness of the returns. However, as the data show,
compared to the excess kurtosis, skewness is a relatively minor contributor to the non-normality
found in the Deutsche Mark rates. Moreover, if one is able to reproduce the stylised facts with
symmetric versions of the models, then this constitutes a lower bound on their ability to mimic
the facts.
A crucial parameter for all models is a, the interest semi-elasticity of money-demand,
which measures how forward-looking agents are with respect to expected changes in the
fundamental and, hence, expected policy actions. Parameter a is responsible for the non-linearity
of the exchange rate solutions. For discretisations, a increases when the time interval is
shortened (the frequency is increased), because the exchange rate becomes more responsive to a
change in the fundamental that is expected to take place a given number of intervals into the
future (see the appendix). Given the other parameter values, a higher a implies that the exchange
rate solution becomes increasingly non-linear, which causes non-norrnality and conditional
heteroskedasticity as shown earlier. It is difficult to make an appropriate choice for a. Estimates
of the interest semi-elasticity in the literature differ considerably by country, model specification
and time period chosen (e.g., see Smith and Wickens, 1986; or Fair, 1987; see Goldfeld and
Sichel, 1990, for an overview). As a compromise, in our simulations, we choose a-0.2 on a
yearly level. Given a and p, the only remaining parameter in the Krugman model is a, which is
varied from lo~o to l0a~o on a yearly level. This seems a reasonable range for shocks to velocity.
[n addition to a non-linear functional relationship between the exchange rate and the
fundamental, the extensions of the basic model also have other sources of non-normality. For the
infra- cum intramarginal interventions model, a non-constant probability of intervention on the
support of f causes stronger non-normality and an additional clustering of periods with high and
low volatility in the exchange rate returns. As argued earlier, bois fixed at a low value (-10), so
that the frequency of intervention is negligible if the exchange rate is at its central parity. Then
the remaining parameters are b~ and a, which is again varied from 1"~o to 10"~0 on a yearly level.
For the Bertola and Caballero model, the additional source of non-nonnality are the
jumps in the exchange rate that occur from time to time when the band is defended. To generate
enough non-normality, exchange rate changes that are caused by jumps should be relatively large
compared to the usual movements of the exchange rate within the band over a short period of
time. Therefore, a should to be relatively small, which at the same time reduces the degree of
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mean-reversion of the exchange rate in its band and, hence, the degree of serial correlation in the
exchange rate retums. Another effect of the relatively large size of the infrequent jumps in the
exchange rate is, however, that it disturbs the clustering of high and low volatility periods, so
that tests against the altemative of ARCH will result in less significant values. In our simulations
we throw away exchange rate series that contain a realignment, in order to study exchange rate
behaviour in the presence of unfulfilled realignment expectations, as explained earlier. Hence,
we need parameter values which are consistent with a low probability of realignment. In
particular, low values for pd and p, and low values for a will serve this purpose. Since our
simulations are confined to symmetric exchange rate solutions, we have that DaD, , Ka K, ,
RáR, and pd-p, . Furthermore, given earlier experience of the EMS, the shift in the central
parity should not be too large if a realignment occurs, and Rd-R, should not be too large
compared to the width of the fundamental band.
4.2. Results for preferred parameter combinations
Table 3 reports the averages of the summary statistics for 10000 series of 189 weekly
observations drawn with our three models. Clearly, for the parameter combinations chosen, one
is able to generate stylised facts found in the data. For all models, values of the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test statistics are below their critical levels, which is consistent with the data. Of
course, this also demonstrates the low power of these tests. In line with this, in none of the
cases, significant autocorrelation is found in the exchange rate returns, as is shown by the
statistics of the Box-Pierce tests. Although the Krugman model produces significant statistics for
the normality test, both the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model and the Bertola and
Caballero model are able to generate much stronger significance of the Jarque-Bera test, together
with an excess kurtosis that is comparable to what is found for the Deutsche Mark series. At the
same time, the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model is able to produce significant
conditional heteroskedasticity, because of the strong variation in intervention frequency over the
fundamental band. In case of the Bertola and Caballero model, fat tails in the distribution of the
exchange rate returns are caused by the relatively large jumps in the exchange rate when the
band is defended. Turning to the other parameters of this model, we see that the probability of a
realignment during a period of more than three years is small. Furthermore, if authorities
intervene to defend the band, the jump of the exchange rate into the band is at most 1.50~0 of the
bandwidth itself, as rough calculations with the exchange rate solution show. A realignment of
the band results in a shift of the central parity that is roughly equal to the width of the exchange
rate band, which seems realistic given earlier experience in the EMS.
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It 0.00 0.00 0.00
a 0.05 0.08 0.0011
cz 0.20 0.20 0.20
bo - -10 -
b, - 250 -
Da-D, - - 0.05
K,-K,-R,-Rr - - 0.00295
Pa~~ - - 0.25






















































f 0.0381 0.0493 0.0230
Remarks:
1. Abbreviations: see remark 5, Table t.
2. Parameter values are based on a yearly frequency level.
3. S~atistics are averages over 10000 series of 189 weekly observations.
4. Estimated standard devietions of computed summary statistics [see the appendix, equa[ion (13)] are reported between brackels.
5. In case of the Bertola and Caballero model, in 0.9"~ of the series one or more realignmentc occurted. These series were thrown
away and replenished by new ones, until the total number of series equalled I0000.
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benchmark a'-2a a'-a12 á-2a á-a12
(a'-cJ4) (a'-4a)
ADF (e) -2.62 -2.49 -2.76 -3.88 -2.29
(0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0085)
JB (~e) 12.65 15.16 10.19 8.91 16.24
(0.21) (0.27) (0.16) (0.11) (0.33)
ARCH(2) (4e) 4.55 5.24 3.85 2.41 5.82
(0.048) (0.054) (0.042) (0.029) (0.064)
f 0.0381 0.0440 0.0336 0.0381 0.0381
benchmark a'-2a a'-a12 a'-2a a'-a12
(a'-aJ4) a'~a
ADF (e) -2.48 -2.94 -2.97 -3.07 -2.50
(0.010) (0.013) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.011)
1B (De) 99.46 28.77 22.03 81.83 66.91
(1.66) (0.55) (0.30) (0.82) (L50)
ARCH(2) (~e) 12.26 6.16 4.77 6.48 I L51
(0.099) (0.067) (0.048) (0.062) (0.107)
f 0.0493 0.0551 0.0413 0.0493 0.0493
benchmark a'-2a a'-0.85a a'-2a a'-a12
(a'-a14) (a'-4a)
ADF (e) -2.19 -2.19 -2.17 -2.19 -2.16
(0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078)
JB (~e) 831.7 896.4 872.0 9 L40 790.1
(52.84) (54.81) (54.36) (3.95) (109.5)
ARCH(2) (4e) 1.86 1.93 1.86 1.78 1.89
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
f 0.0230 0.0230 0.0230 0.0230 0.0230
real. series 0.90o~a 1.1I"~o 0.95"~a 3.47"~a 0.18"~0
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Table 4: Effects on key statistics of changes in common parameters.
I. See remarks I to 4, Table 3.
2. For benchmark parameter combina[ions, see Table 3.
3. A parameter which has been changed away from its benchmark value is indica[ed by a príme, e.g. a'-2a means that the alpha-
parameter has become twice its benchmark value.
4. 'Real. series' stsnds for percentage of series that conuined one or more realignments, and, therefore, had to be thrown away.
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4.3. Efjects of changes in the parameters
In this section we try to give an impression how key statistics are affected if the values
of one or more of the parameters are changed, while the other parameters are kept at the values
they have at the most preferred point (see Table 3), which will be referred to as the 'benchmark
values'.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions, since the relationship between fundamental
and exchange rate is a non-linear one, which changes when parameter values change, and,
moreover, the change in the relationship interacts with the behaviour of the fundamental
(because it affects the actions of the authorities). Still, to some extent, we are able to separate
the effects of a change in the exchange rate solution from a change in the uncontrollable
component v(t) of the fundamental. For all three models, it is easy to see [e.g., from equation (7)
in case of the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model] that the exchange rate solution as a
function of the fundamental remains unaffected by changes in a, p and a, as long as the
parameter combinations ap and avZ are kept fixed. Therefore, on the one hand, one can change
a, which does not affect the behaviour of the uncontrollable component v(t) of the fundamental,
while, on the other hand, one can change a, the instantaneous standard deviation of v(t), and
simultaneously change a(assuming p-0), such that the exchange rate as a function of the
fundamental is unchanged. Tables 4(a), (b) and (c) show the effects of these changes on the key
statistics. For the Krugman model they are easy to explain. An increase in a increases the
'degree of non-linearity' of the exchange rate solution, because the implied fundamental band
(for a given exchange rate band) becomes wider and the S-shape of the exchange rate solution
gets more pronounced. This implies a stronger clustering of high and low volatility periods in
the exchange rate, and the significance of the tests for normality and conditional
heteroskedasticity increases. An increase in o, while keeping the exchange rate solution
unchanged (by changing a appropriately), results in faster movements of the exchange rate
between its boundaries and, therefore, in less clustering of high and low volatility periods, and,
hence, less significance of the norrnality and conditional heteroskedasticity tests. Moreover, since
the mean-reversion in the exchange rate movements increases, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
tends more towards significance. For the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model, the
intervention policy seems too complicated to give a clear-cut explanation of the effects of the
parameter changes. In case of the Bertola and Caballero model we choose a'-2a, as before, and
a'-0.85a, since for lower values of a' the exchange rate solution as a function of the
fundamental becomes non-monotonous in order to fulfill the value-matching conditions (10),
and, therefore, the effects of a change in a' on the behaviour of the exchange rate get more
26 Chapter 2















benchmark Da'-D,'-0.06 Ká -K,'-Re'-R~ - Pe'-P~ -0.125
0.0200
ADF (e) -2.19 -2.20 -2.18 -2.17
(0.0078) ( 0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0076)
JB (De) 831.7 2066 493.3 107.6
(52.84) ( 128.8) (27.86) (9.31)
ARCH(2) ( 4e) 1.86 2.38 1.88 2.00
(0.020) ( 0.045) (0.021) (0.026)
f 0.0230 0.0179 0.0220 0.0246
real. series 0.90a~o 1.280~o I.37o~0 0.410~0
I. See remarks I to 4, Table 3.
2. For benchmark paramcter combinations, see Table 3.
3. A parameter which has been changed away from its benchmark value is indicated by a prime.
4. 'Real. series' stands for percentage of series that contained one or more realignmen[s, and, therefore. had to be thrown away.
complicated. Still, as shown in Table 4(c), the magnitudes of the test statistics hardly change
when a is varied at the benchmark parameter combination. This is no longer the case when a is
changed, while keeping the exchange rate solution unaltered. A lower a means that outliers
caused by jumps in the exchange rate become more pronounced, so that tests for normality
become more significant, ceteris paribus. However, as the last column in the table shows, jumps
in the exchange rate also occur less often if a is reduced, which has a lowering effect on the
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mean of the normality test statistic. The combination of less frequent, but more pronounced
jumps, results in a higher variance of this test statistic.
Tables 5(a) and (b) shows how key statistics are affected if we change specific
parameters of the extensions of the Krugman model. These are the parameters which relate to
the controllable part of the fundamental, i.e. the actions of the authorities. In case of the infra-
cum intramarginal interventions model, less frequent intervention near the edges of the band is
captured by a lower b, . A decrease of b, from 250 to 225 decreases the intervention frequency
from 70"~o to about SOo~o when the distance of the exchange rate to its boundaries is less than lo~o
of the bandwidth itself Since the intervention frequency now does not change so much on the
support of f, there is less clustering of high and low volatility periods, and, hence, tests for
normality and conditional heteroskedasticity become less significant. For the Bertola and
Caballero model, exchange rate jumps become less pronounced if the (unfulfilled) jump in the
central parity (Dd ,D,) is smaller, or if, after an intervention, the fundamental jump (Kd ,K, ,Dd ,D,)
is smaller. This results in less significant values of the normality test. Similarly, if the market
believes that the realignment probability (p, ,p,) is lower, the exchange rate jump is smaller if
authorities indeed happen to defend the band when the exchange rate reaches a boundary.
5. Concluding remarks
In this chapter some stylised facts of weekly Deutsche Mark exchange rates in the EMS
for the period January 1987 to August 1990 were presented and compared to the behaviour of
corresponding dollar rates against currencies in the EMS. While for all exchange rate series the
unit root hypothesis was difficult to reject, tests for non-normality in the returns were highly
significant for all of the Deutsche Mark rates, but insignificant for all of the dollar rates, and
tests for conditional heteroskedasticity were significant for some of the Deutsche Mark rates, but
for none of dollar rates. These findings suggested the presence of special band effects on the
behaviour of Deutsche Mark rates. We used a Monte Carlo experiment to investigate three target
zone models - the basic Krugman model, a model combining inframarginal interventions with
intramarginal interventions à la Lewis (1990) and the Bertola and Caballero (1992) model (with
unfulfilled realignment expectations) - in their ability to explain these phenomena. The exchange
rate is a non-linear function of the fundamental, which causes conditional heteroskedasticity and
non-normality in the exchange rate returns. However, the degree of non-normality resulting from
this non-linear functional relationship alone is not enough to reproduce the findings for the
Deutsche Mark rates. For the infra- cum intramarginal interventions model, the increasing
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intervention frequency towards the boundaries of the band is an additional source of non-
normality and conditional heteroskedasticity, and for the Bertola and Caballero model, the
relatively large, but infrequent, jumps in the exchange rate provide an additional source of non-
normality.
The findings show that the Bertola and Caballero model can mimic the most salient facts
of for example the lira and the French franc against the Deutsche Mark, which show strong non-
normality but no conditional heteroskedasticity of the ARCH type, while the infra- cum
intramarginal interventions model is able to generate (simultaneously) enough non-nonnality and
conditional heteroskedasticity to produce test statistics of comparable magnitude to those
obtained for the Dutch guilder and the Irish punt against the Deutsche Mark.
A tentative conclusion arises, namely that the broad consensus about the limited
usefulness of the first generation of target zone models to describe EMS exchange rate
behaviour, might have been caused by the emphasis that has been put on detecting a(very)
specific non-linear relationship between fundamental and exchange rate (e.g., see Flood, Rose
and Mathieson, 1991). Slightly more complicated target zone models can be so flexible in the
implied relationship between fundamental and exchange rate, that it is difficult to detect model-
specific non-linearities in the data. Thus, in trying to model EMS exchange rate behaviour it
might be more useful to investigate a richer variety of exogenous shocks as well as a richer
description of authorities' policy.
Appendix: The simulatian procedure
This appendix explains the simulation procedure in more detail. We closely follow the
theory exposed in Duffie and Singleton (1988).
To simulate the models, they are approximated by discrete-time versions. The discrete-
time parameter values are adjusted to the sampling frequency at which we simulate. The
exchange rate band is given by the interval [-0.0225, 0.0225].
First, consider simulation of the basic Krugman model and denote the discrete time
analogues of a, p and a by ad , pd and ad respectively. Every time interval is divided into n
parts, and a process f of 'in-between' simulations and a'shadow process' f are defined. For each
in-between simulation, a value of the shadow process is obtained as
f(ttk~n] - f(t}(k-l~n] t paln t e[ttk~n] v~n , k-1,..,n, (I1)
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where the e's are independently simulated from a standazdnormal distribution. The drift
parameter and the standard deviation are adjusted for the number of in-between simulations, n.
The in-between simulated value for the fundamental is given by
f , if fjttkln]Sf ,
fjttkln] - fjttk~n] , iffjttkln]e(f,f),
f , if fjttkln]?f .
(12)
After each run of n in-between simulations, a simulated value for the fundamental is obtained:
fjtt 1 J- f~tt 1].
Hence, appropriate simulation of the fundamental requires that polaa be kept fixed if the
sampling frequency is changed. Together with the notion that the exchange rate solution can be
expressed in terms of pla2 and aaZ, or pla~ and ap, this requires us to keep ad pd constant also
for a change in the sampling frequency. The simulated value of the exchange rate at time ttl is
obtained by substitution of polaá for plaZ, ad pd for ap, and the simulated value fjttl] for f into
the exchange rate solution.
Simulation of the other models is analogous to simulation of the Krugman model. As
before, when changing the sampling frequency, one has to keep ~laZ and ap fixed. For the
infra- cum intramarginal interventions model the processes f and f are used again. But now, for
each in-between simulation, a number rz is drawn from the uniform distribution between zero
and one. If rz5a(fjtt(k-1)In]), the fundamental process is stopped and f[ttkln] - f[tt(k-1)In]. If
n~a(f[tt(k-1)In]), ftttk~n] is given by (11) and f[ttk~n] follows from (12). For kln integer, the
exchange rate is obtained by interpolation at f[ttk~n] from points of the numerical approximation
to the exchange rate solution. This solution is obtained using a shooting algorithm which is
iteratively applied to make the solution fulfill the smooth pasting conditions.
[n the simulation procedure for the Bertola and Caballero model, a number n is drawn
from the uniform distribution between zero and one when f[ttkln] crosses one of the boundaries
of (f,f]. If ïrSpd (for f hitting the upper boundary; similarly for f hitting the lower boundary), a
realignment takes place at which the fundamental jumps to a position Kd above the new
underbound (for simplicity, the new fundamental band is shifted back to the old one). If n~pd,
the band is defended and the fundamental jumps to a position Rd below the upper boundary.
We draw exchange rate series of 189 observations, which equals the sample size of the
data series, and compute the key test statistics from these series. This is done N times (in our
case N-10000) and the means of the statistics are taken over the N series. [n fact, the N
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exchange rate series are obtained from one long simulated series. Between each pair of series of
189 simulations, another 100 observations are drawn and thrown away, to rule out serial
correlation in the test statistics. If x„ is the realisation of test statistic x obtained for the n-th
(n-1, .., N) series, an unbiased estimator of the expectation of x is given by x-(Eó-,x„)IN. An
unbiased estimator of the variance of x is given by
.
(13)V(z) - N(N 1) ~ (x~-z)z
Because the marginal densities of the exchange rate are unknown for the infra- cum
intramarginal interventions model and the Bertola and Caballero model, we also throw away a
number of simulations right after the start to rule out the influence of the inital position of the
fundamental. For the simulations of the Bertola and Caballero model, we throw away all series
in which one or more realignments occur, because we are interested only in exchange rate
behaviour under unfulfilled realignment expectations. Simulation continues untill we have
obtained N series without realignments. We note that N should be relatively large because of the
small probability that the exchange rate jumps in a sample of 189 observations [the 'Peso
problem', see e.g. Krasker (1980)]).
Chapter 3:
Imperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia
in the European Monetary System
1. Iutroduction
Despite growing consensus among economists in recent years that the European
Monetary System (EMS) has become increasingly successful in stabilising exchange rates
between participants, the developments in September and November 1992 have demonstrated
that the credibility of the currency bands has again become a problem. For the British pound
participation in the system of bilateral exchange rate bands has been abandoned, while for the
ltalian lira it has been suspended shortly after a realignment. Moreover, the Spanísh peseta has
undergone two realignments, and the French franc and the [rish punt have been under heavy
speculative pressure. In view of these events it seems important to be able to make an
appropriate assessment of the expected rate of depreciation of exchange rates in the system, and,
related to this, their devaluation risk and their realignment risk (below, the differences between
these terrns will be made precisely). Estimates of these variables provide us with information
about the credibility of the exchange rate bands as perceived by the market and how this
credibility changes over time. Therefore, in this chapter we try to construct estimates for these
variables of interest. In our definition, the expected depreciation rate is the expected rate of
change of the exchange rate. The difference between a realignment and a devaluation is that a
devaluation measures the actual jump of the exchange rate at a realignment, which is the sum of
the jump in the central parity (the realignment itself) and the jump in the deviation of the
exchange rate from its central parity.
One of the articles, which originates from the literature on exchange rate target zones
and which addresses the problem of inferring realignment risk, is Bertola and Svensson (1990).
In their model, realignment risk is an exogenous stochastic process, and, under some specific
assumptions about this process, they simulate patterns of exchange rate time series which
resemble the movements of the French franclDeutsche Mark (Ffr~DM) over time. They indicate
how empirical estimates of realignment risk may be constructed by subtracting estimates of
expected changes of the exchange rate within its band from interest rate differentials. Rose and
Svensson (1991) use this method to estimate realignment risk for EMS exchange rates, and with
a similar procedure Svensson (1991c) obtains estimates of their devaluation risk. lndeed, the
adjustments of the interest rate differentials to construct estimates of these variables of interest
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are of non-trivial magnitude, so that it is important to obtain appropriate estimates of the
movements of the exchange rate within its band. Lindberg, Svensson and Sóderlind (1991) use
the approach just outlined to estimate realignment expectations for the target zone of the
Swedish krona against a weighted average of the currencies of its main trading partners. They
apply a variety of estimation methods and use a number of specifications to estimate the
expected change of the exchange rate within its band. For the articles mentioned, specification of
models for this variable are based on the predictions of the target zone literature, in particular
that there should be a nearly linear relationship between the expected rate of depreciation within
the band and the deviation of the exchange rate from its central parity.
In this chapter, we try to extend the analysis of the articles just mentioned in a number
of ways. Firstly, these articles make the assumption of uncovered interest pariry (UIP), while,
elsewhere in the empirical literature, there is strong evidence of (time-varying) risk premia,
especially in forward markets for dollar exchange rates (e.g., see Hodrick, 1987, and the
references therein). This does not necessarily imply, however, that there is a risk-premium for
EMS exchange rates as well. In fact, Svensson (1992a) uses a target zone model, in which there
is some exogenous and constant probability of a realignment irrespective of the eschange rate
position in its band. He derives an expression for the risk premium, which consists of two
components: one due to exchange rate movements in the band, and the other due to devaluation
risk. The first one is proportional to ihe variance of the exchange rate in its band and is shown
to be negligible. The second one is shown to be small relative to the expected rate of change in
the central parity for reasonable values of the model parameters. However, since tests of target
zone models on EMS exchange rates have not been very successful [e.g., see Meese and Rose,
1990; and Flood, Rose and Mathieson, 1991) and Svensson's (1992a) assumptions about the
realignment process are rather restrictive, it is not clear to what extent his argument is applicable
to EMS exchange rates. Therefore, it seems safer to relax the UIP assumption and let the data
decide about the presence of a risk premium.
Because the expected rate of realignment, the expected rate of depreciation within the
band and the risk premium are linked by an identiry, we model them jointly, using the same
regression specification for each variable and applying adding up restrictions, which are
automatically fulfilled in our special case. As explanatory variables we include variables
suggested by the target zone literature, like the position of the exchange rate in the band and
nonlinear terms, and the forward discount, because of the identity just mentioned. To construct
estimates for the expected rate of devaluation, one needs to have estimates of the expected rate
of depreciation within the band conditional on the absence of a realignment. Specification of
models for this variable is along the same lines as for the other variables.
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Our empirical analysis is restricted to the FfrIDM and the IiralDeutsche Mark (IiralDM),
because these are the exchange rates between the largest economies in the EMS, which have
participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism from its start onwards. Moreover, as already
noticed, they have been under heavy pressure recently, which makes them interesting to study.
The estimates suggest that important detertninants of the unconditional expected rate of
depreciation within the band are the curtent position in the band, and, in particular for the
FfrIDM, the forward discount. The position of the exchange rate in the band is also an important
determinant of the conditional (upon no realignment) expected rate of depreciation within the
band. For the FfrIDM there are slight indications of the presence of nonlineari[ies, but this is not
the case for the IiralDM. The results suggest the presence of a risk premium which is small and
fairly constant for the FfrIDM, but highly time-varying for the liralDM, where the forward
discount is an important explanatory variable of the risk premium. It becomes sizable from time
to time and it is often of the same magnitude as the expected rate of depreciation within the
band. Contrary to what one might have expected, the position of the exchange rate in the band
does not seem to have any explanatory power for the risk premium. Adjusting interest rate
differentials with Germany for our estimates (unconditional and conditional upon no
realignment) of the expected rate of depreciation within the band, it is possible to construct
estimates for the expected rates of realignment and devaluation under UIP. When UIP is relaxed,
for all variables of interest - the expected rates of depreciation, realignment and devaluation - an
additional adjustment has to be made for the estimated risk premium. Note that risk premium
estimates are interesting in their own right also, because they give an indication about the costs
of not formally mling out any further realignments in the EMS. For example, real interest
payments on govemment debt of countries with a weak currency are higher if there is an
exchange rate risk premium.
The outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. [n section 2 we show how our
variables of interest relate to each other. Section 3 motivates the empirical specifications for the
regression analysis. Section 4 presents estimates of expected rates of depreciation within the
band, unconditional and conditional upon no realignment, while section S presents estimates of
the risk premium. In section 6, we assess and compare (under UIP and when UIP is relaxed) the
adjustments of interest rate differentials which are needed to constmct estimates of our variables
of interest. Section 7 concludes this chapter.
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2. The expected rates of depreciation, realignment and devaluation
Define s, as the logarithm (in the sequel level variables are in logarithms, while
differences are assumed to be expressed in percentages, i.e. the difference between loglevels
times 100"~0) of the nominal exchange rate (measured as the number of units of the home
currency needed to buy one Deutsche Mark) and c, as the central parity of the exchange rate.
Furthermore, we refer to x, - s, - c, as the exchange rate within the band. Then the expected rate
depreciation of the exchange rate over some time interval from t to ttt is the expected change
of the exchange rate in percentages on an annual basis, hence is given by E,[4s,,, ]h - E, [s11 -
s,]~t. Later on, in our empirical investigation, we shall take t to be a month (lll2 year).
The expected rate of realignment is given by E, [c„~ ]k, where a realignment refers to the
jump in the central parity, which occurs when the band on the exchange rate is changed. By a
deva(uation, we mean the actual jump of the exchange rate at a realignment. Hence, a
devaluation is the sum of the jump of the central parity and the jump of the exchange rate within
the band at a realignment. It is important to distinguish between realignments and devaluations,
because often the jump of the exchange rate within the band is of the same order of magnitude
as the jump of the central parity, as we shall see.
The expected rate of depreciation can be linked to the expected rate of realignment,
using the definition of the expected rate of depreciation within the band,
E~ [Os~.. ] - E~ [Ac~K ] t E~ [0~., ] - (I)
The expected rate of depreciation is the sum of the expected rate of realignment and the
expected rate of depreciation within the band, or, alternatively, the expected rate of realignment
is obtained by subtracting the expected rate of depreciation within the band from the expected
rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.
Denote by f,t the forward rate at time t for a contract due at time ttt, and by S,, -i,., - i;,
the interest rate differential on an annual basis at time t for deposits of the same default risk and
the same time to maturity V0. Thus, i,~ is the nominal interest rate on deposits denoted in the
home currency and i; , the nominal interest rate on deposits denoted in Deutsche Marks.
Assuming covered interest parity (CIP), one has
s~. - (f~., - s~ )it , (~)
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Furthermore, one has the identity
E~ [os,., l } [f., - E, s,.. ] - (f~.r - sJ, (3)
where [f„ - E, s„~ ] will be referred to as the risk premium. It is the difference between the
forward rate and the expected future spot rate at the maturity of the forward contract. Under
uncovered interest parity, the risk premium should be zero, and the expected rate of depreciation
of the exchange rate equals the interest rate differential. Upon substitution of (1) into (3), one
obtains
E~ [Oc~.. ] t E~ [A~S., l t [fi, - E~ s~-~ ~ - (fi. - s~ ) , (4)
which states that the forward discount equals the sum of the expected rate of realígnment, the
expected rate of depreciation within the band and the risk premium. If market participants are
risk neutral, then (4) reduces to
E~ IDc~t~ l } E~ [A~.. ] - (fcz - s~ ) , (5)
which, together with the assumption of CIP, implies UIP.
One way to test for UIP, is to specify a regression model for the expected rate of
realignment and the expected rate of depreciation within the band, including the same regressors
(the forward discount should be one of the regressors) in both equations, and test for the adding-
up restrictions implied by (5).
A complication with regressions based on (4) and (5) is that x, (and other variables as
well) usually jumps at realignments, as Svensson (1991c) notes. This might introduce a small
sample bias in the estimates, because the total number of jumps of x, could be too small to
obtain reliable results. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) plot the Ffr~DM and the IiralDM exchange rates
respectively, together with the boundaries of their fluctuation margins. The data are daily from
13 March 1979 (the start of the EMS) till 16 May 1990. Details about the data are given in the
appendix. During the sample period, the central parity of the Ffr~DM has undergone six
realignments and the central parity of the liralDM nine realignments. Note that for the Ffr~DM at
every realignment the jump in the exchange rate is less in magnitude than the jump in the central
parity, while for the Iira~DM this is the case for the majoriry of the realignments. This implies
that the exchange rate within the band usually jumps at a realignment. Svensson (1991c)
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proposes to rewrite the expected rate of depreciation within the band as
E~ [A?4.~ ] -(1-P~ ) E~ [Ox~.. I NR] t P~ E~ [~~., ~ R]
- E~ [~~-t I NR] - P[ {E~ [~.~ I NR] - E~ [~4,. ~ R]} , (6)
where p; is defined as the probability that a realignment will occur between time t and time ttt
and where R and NR denote the events of a realignment, respectively no realignment between t
and tti. Substituting (6) into (4), and rearranging, one obtains
E~ [Oc~., ]It f P~ {E~ [~4.t I NR] - E~ [?4,~ ~ R]}It
- (f,, - s, )k - E, [Ox,,, ~ NR]h - [f„ - E, s„~ ]I2
- S,, - E, [Ox„~ ~ NR]li - [f , - E, s,., ]li . (7)
In Svensson ( 1991c), the term -[f„ - E, s1z ]h on the right hand side of (7) drops out, because he
assumes UIP. Following Svensson, we refer to the left-hand side of (7) as the operational
definition of the ezpected rate oj devaluation, or, as we will do in the following, simply the
expected rate ojdevaluation. One can construct estimates for the expected rate of devaluation by
estimating models for the conditional expected rate of depreciation within the band and the risk
premium and subtract these estimates from the interest rate differential.
3. Specification of the regression models
In this section we shall motivate the regression specifications which we use for the
estimation of the conditional and unconditional expected rates of depreciation within the band, as
well as the risk premium, for the case where we relax UIP. As already explained, these estimates
can be used to obtain estimates of our variables of interest.
The regression models in Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensson (1991c) are motivated
by the predictions of the target zone literature. One of their explanatory variables for the
expected rate of change of the exchange rate within the band is the current exchange rate within
the band, ~, in order to pick up a potential mean-reversion of the exchange rate within the band.
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[n fact, in the standard target zone model (see Krugman, 1991) and some of its generalisations
(see Svensson, 1991a,b), where there is an exogenous and constant probabiliry of a realignment,
the exchange rate within the band is mean-reverting and it is the only determinant of the
expected future exchange rate position in the band. The relationship between these two variables
is almost linear as Svensson (1991b) shows. To check for the presence of non-linearities that
might have been induced by the presence of the boundaries on the exchange rate, Rose and
Svensson (1991) also include x; and x; as regressors. Furtherrnore, they introduce a dummy for
each exchange rate regime, where a regime is defined as the period between two subsequent
realignments. In this way one might allow for the effects of potential changes in monetary
policies after realignments (e.g., changes in relative growth rates of money supplies).
We follow Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensson (1991c) in our choice of the
regression specifications, but, in addition, we include the forward discount as a regressor, for
reasons outlied in the previous section, but also because many of the empirical studies (e.g., see
Hodrick, 1987, and the references therein), find that the forward discount has significant
explanatory power for the risk premium:
E~ ~~c~n ~IZ - E~-i ao~ d~ t Ek-~ a~k xk t az (fi. - si ),
E~ [~~4., jlt - Ei-i Qo~ d~ t E~-~ aik x~ t Í3z (f~.~ - s~ ),




where r is the number of regimes and where the dependent variables have been divided by t in
order to obtain coefficient estimates on an annual basis. By including x, in (8a) and (8c) one
might pick up effects of the position of the exchange rate in its band on realignment expectations
and on the risk premium, because it is often said that the credibility of the band comes into
question when a weak currency approaches the upper boundary of its band with the Deutsche
Mark. Equations (4) and (8a)-(8c) imply:
aot Ro~} Yo~ - 0, i-1,..,r ,
alkf F'Ikf Ylk - ~ ~ k-1,..,3 , (9)
a~ t Rz } Yz - I ~t .
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Because all regressors are predetermined at time t, we can use ordinary least squares to obtain
consistent estimates of their coefficients. The adding-up restrictions (9) are automatically
fulfilled by the estimates and the residuals sum up to zero (over the equations) for all t. In the
presence of the well-known overlapping observations problem (the time to maturity t exceeds
the sampling interval) consistent estimates of the standard errors are obtained by using the
method proposed in Newey and West ( ]987). It is also easy to see that in the underlying case,
where the set of regressors is the same for all equations, simultaneous estimation of two out of
three equations yields exactly the same results as separate estimation, both for the coefficient
estimates and for the estimated standard errors.
Imposing [3z -0 in (8b) gives one of the specifications that Rose and Svensson ( 1991) use
for the ( unconditional) expected rate of depreciation within the band. UIP is tested by testing the
hypothesis that all coefficients in (8c) are jointly equal to zero [yo; (t~i)-y,k (t~k)-y, -0], which
says that, given the information in the right hand side variables of (8c), the forward rate is an
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. Rejection of this hypothesis suggests the presence of a,
possibly time-varying, risk-premium. The hypothesis of a constant risk premium is formulated as
the joint hypothesis that the dummy coefficients are all equal to each other but different from
zero, and that all other coefficients in (8c) are zero [yo; (d~~-Yo ~0~ Y~k (dk)-y, -0]. If the dummy
coefficients are not equal to each other, and all other coefficients in (8c) are zero, then this
suggests the presence of a risk-premium which is constant for a given regime, but which changes
at a realignment, because of a jump in the perceived riskiness of the exchange rate.
To analyse the expected rate of devaluation [equation (7)] we specify for the expected
rate of depreciation within the band, conditional on the absence of a realignment:
E~ [~z4., ~ NR]It - E;-~ Ro~ d~ t E~-i Rir x~ t Rz ( fi, - s~) , ( l 0a)
The complementary regression equation is:
E~ [fi.~ - s~., I NR]It - Ei-i Yo~ d~ t~k~i Yn x~ } Yz (f .- s~) , (106)
so that [3a t Ya - 0(d~)~ Rik } Y~n - 0(tlk), and (3z t yz - Ilt.
When the nonlinear terms and the forward discount are excluded from (l0a) (i.e., [3~? (313 [3z-0),
Svensson's ( 1991c) specification is obtained.
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4. Estimates of the unconditional and conditional expected
rates of depreciation withiu the band
In this section estimates are presented for the expected rate of depreciation within the
band, both unconditional and conditional upon no realignment. These estimates can be used to
construct estimates of our variables of interest under UIP. Then, the expected rate of
deprecia[ion is given by the interest rate differential. The expected rates of realignment [equation
(5)] and devaluation [equation (7)] can be estimated by subtracting an estimate of the
unconditional, respectively, conditional expected rate of depreciation within the band from the
interest rate differential. Thus, in this section, the main difference with Rose and Svensson
(1991) and Svensson (1991c) is the use of more extensive specifications for the unconditional
and conditional expected rate of depreciation within the band. In the next section we present risk
premium estimates which enable us to construct estimates for our variables of interest when UIP
is relaxed.
As already explained, here and in the sequel, estimation takes place by OLS, using the
Newey and West (1987) adjustment for the standard errors. Tables 1(a) (FfrIDM) and 1(b)
(IiralDM) present estimates for various restricted specifications of E, [Ox„~ ], the unconditional
expected rate of depreciation within the band. To save space, we only report results for
specifications for which the dummy coefficients are restric[ed to be equal across regimes. Earlier
regressions (not reported here) suggest that unrestricted estimation results in dummy coefficient
estimates which are very sensitive to the backward jump of the exchange rate within the band,
which takes place at the end of each regime. Also, we are not able to compare our resul[s with
those obtained by Rose and Svensson (199]), who use an unrestricted specification, because they
report estimates that are numerically identical Svensson's (1991c) estimates of the conditiona!
expected rate of depreciation within the band, which must be due to a reporting error. Columns
(a) of Tables 1(a) and (b) show that for both the Ffr~DM, respectively the Iira~DM, the current
position of the exchange rate in its band enters with a negative coefficient, indicating mean-
reversion of the exchange rate within the band. In both cases, the t-ratios are well below -2.86,
the critical value (at a So~o level) of the standard Dickey-Fuller (see Fuller, 1976) unit root test.
One should be careful however, because the potential presence of conditional heteroskedasticity
may invalidate these standard critical values to a certain extent. In columns (b) of Tables I(a)
and (b), estimates are reported for a specification in which the non-linear terms x; and x; are
added. The results suggest that non-linearities may play a role, but one has to be careful because
the jumps in x, may cause outliers in the nonlinear terms, which could have influenced the
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Table 1: Estimates of the unconditional expected rate of depreciation within the band
(equation (8b); in "~o on annual basis)
(a) FfrIDM
(a) (b) (c)
constant -0.17 (0.70) 1.09 (0.66) 3.53 (0.74)
x, -3.34 ( 0.68) -1.08 (0.96) -2.86 (0.56)
x; - -1.16 (0.54) -
x; - -0.88 (0.32) -
f,,-s, - - -7.90 (1.57)
N 2542 2542 2542
Ho: (3Z-0 - - 25.3 (1)
JH 24.0 (1) 27.4 (3) 35.8 (2)
(6J LiraIDM
(a) (b) (c)
constant - 0.31 (1.08) 2.94 (1.25) 6.46 (3.82)
x, -2.22 ( 0.54) -1.55 (0.71) -2.37 (0.56)
x; - -0.87 (0.32) -
x; - -0.12 (.069) -
f,~- s, - - -9.16 (5.69)
N 2606 2606 2604
H~ : (i, -0 - - 2.59 (1)
ill ~ it,r, rll I~i-I i:~ i--~ i,.i
Remarks:
I. Standard errors are given between brackets.
2. N is the number of observations.
3. All tests are chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis with the degrees of freedom given between brackets.
4. 'JH' stands for the joint hypothesis that all ccefficients, except for dummy ccefficients or constant, are jointly equal to zero.
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estimates. Columns (c) report results for the case where we add the forward discount as an
additional explanatory variable. For the FfrIDM both the forward discount and the position in the
band aze significant at a Sa~o level. The significantly negative coefficient of the forwazd discount
can be explained by the fact that for the FfrIDM extremely high interest rate differentials are
often followed by a realignment at which x, jumps downward. For the IiralDM, only the
exchange rate within the band is significant, although the forward discount is close to significance.
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Table 2: Estimates of the expected rate of depreciation within the band
conditional on no realignment (equation (l0a); in "~o on annual basis)
(a) Ffr~DM
(a) (b) (c)
d, 3.72 (0.90) 3.59 (0.93) 4.40 (1.16)
dz -0.18 (1.44) 0.71 (1.61) 0.65 (1.85)
d, 5.55 (2.49) 6.68 (2.76) 6.93 (3.34)
d, 2.83 (1.36) 3.24 ( I.46) 4.73 (2.52)
d, -0.06 (0.55) 0.29 (0.59) 1.09 (1.27)
db 3.95 (2.04) 3.75 (2.25) 4.56 (2.10)
d, 1.62 (0.88) 1.92 (1.02) 2.06 (0.97)
x, -1.98 (0.49) -0.34 (1.03) -1.81 (0.52)
x; - -0.46 (0.33) -
x; - -0.60 (0.28) -
ft, - s, - - -2.04 (2.17)
N 2426 2426 2426
No ~ Qo~'Qoi (d~) 19.5 (6) 15.7 (6) 19.3 (6)
Ho: (iz-0 - - 0.89 (1)
1H 16.4 (I) 34.6 (3) 16.9 (2)
(b) LiralDM
d, -2.42 (2.57) -2.70 (2.95) -0.41 (3.19)
dZ 4.25 ( 1.86) 4.88 ( I.83) 6.80 (2.94)
d, 3.69 (2.86) 3.89 (2.87) 6.88 (3.22)
d, 7.11 (3.01) 7.25 (3.19) 10.2 (4.44)
d~ 4.00 (3.20) 3.98 (3.47) 7.62 (4.83)
da 1.22 (1.97) 2. U(2.41) 3.92 (3.34)
d, 2.00 (1.44) 1.86 (1.43) 4.68 (2.95)
de 0.37 (1.03) -.021 (I.51) 2.18 (2.04)
d9 3.32 (1.48) 4.40 ( I.84) 4.86 (2.08)
d,o -6.75 ( 0.88) -7.10 (1.I4) -5.56 (1.46)
x, -1.13 (0.46) -1.67 (O.ïl) -].08 (0.45)
x; - -0.14 (0.20) -
x; - 0.023 (.048) -
f„ - s, - - -3.17 (2.98)
N 2431 2431 2429
No : Qo~-aoi (di) 99.8 (9) 100.2 (9) 75.0 (9)
H~: Q,-O - - 1.13 (I)
JH 6.12 ( 1) 11.8 (3) 8.18 (2)
Rcmark. See rcmarks 1 to 4 Table 1.
In Tables 2(a) (FfrIDM) and 2(b) QiralDM), estimates are given for models of the
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expected depreciation rate within the band, conditional upon no realignment. The specifications
corresponding to columns (a) are the same as the ones estimated by Svensson (1991c), and,
indeed, our estimates are numerically the same as Svensson's estimates. For the majority of the
realignments, the dummy coefficients enter with positive sign, which is explained by the fact
that usually, at a realignment, the exchange rate jumps from a weak position in its old band to a
stronger position in its new band and then starts to depreciate within the band. For both
currencies, the hypothesis that the dummy coefficients are equal across regimes is rejected for all
specifications. Contrary to the case where we did not condition on the absence of realignments,
here we do not expect the dummy coefficient estimates to suffer from outliers. There are two
main differences with the results for the unconditional expected rate of depreciation within the
band First, the forward discount has lost much of its explanatory power [columns (c)]. The
reason is that the realignments and the jumps of the exchange rate within the band coincide and
are usually preceded by peaks in the forward discount, in particular for the FfdDM. Secondly,
for the Iira~DM, the estimated coefficient of x, has also lost much of its explanatory power,
which can be explained by the exclusion of the downward jumps in x, at realignments. These
jumps exert a mean-reverting influence. Again, note that for the FfrIDM there is some indication
of non-linearities [column (b), Table 2(a)].
5. Estimates of the risk premium
Tables 3(a) (FfrIDM) and 3(b) (Iira~DM) present estimates for various specifications of the risk
premium model. As explained before, we restrict the dummy coefficients to be equal across
regimes. For both currencies and all specifications, the hypothesis that the regression coefficients
are jointly equal to zero is rejected. This suggests the presence of a risk premium, contrary to
what Rose and Svensson (1991) and Svensson (1991c) assume. Columns (a) report the results
when only a constant is included as a regressor. For both exchange rates it is significant. The
interpretation is interesting. For most of the sample the forward rate lies above the realised spot
rate at maturity date. Only in case of a realignment between date t and t~t, the realised spot rate
lies above the forward rate. When market participants are risk neutral these occasional jumps of
s,,, beyond f„ should on average offset that f4, lies above s,,, for most of the time. The position
of the exchange rate within the band [columns (b)] is neither significant for the Ffr~DM nor for
the IiralDM, which is remarkable, because it is often suggested that realignment risk increases in
the EMS when the exchange rate approaches the weak edge of its band. Including nonlinear
terms [columns (c)] dces not have a significant effect on the results either, although for the
FfrIDM the cubic term is not far from significance. Columns (d) report results for a specification
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Table 3: Estimates for the risk premium (equation ( 8c); in "Io on annual basis)
(a) Ffr~DM
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
constant 2.06 (0.75) 2.11 (0.78) 2.56 (0.89) 1.70 (1.14) 1.85 (1.06)
x, - 0.64 (0.80) -1.44 (1.06) - 0.56 (2.80)
x~ - - -0.24 (0.69) - -
x; - - 0.68 (0.37) - -
f„ - s, - - - 0.77 (2.92) 0.61 (0.70)
N 2545 2542 2542 2542 2542
1HIC 7.48 (1) 7.59 (2) 15.7 (4) 9.53 (2) 10.6 (3)
JHEC - 0.65 (1) 6.39 (3) 0.07 (1) 0.87 (2)
(bJ Lira~DM
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
constant 4.25 (0.94) 4.22 (0.97) 4.37 (1.31) -1.68 (2.61) -1.68 (2.62)
x, - -0.14 (0.44) 0.38 (0.75) - -.0068 (0.45)
x; - - -.067 (0.25) - -
x; - - -.046 (.060) - -
f~, - s, - - - 7.98 (3.57) 7.98 (3.65)
N 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604
1HIC 20.5 (1) 24.6 (2) 26.9 (4) 22.6 (2) 27.4 (3)
JHEC - 0.01 (1) I.50 (3) 4.99 (I) 5.25 (2)
Remarks:
L See remarks I to 3 Table I.
2. 7HIC' s[ands for the hypothesis that all ccetticients are jointly equal to zero.
3. 7HEC stands for Ihe hypothesis Ihat aIl coefficients, ezcept for Ihe constanL are jointly equal to zero.
which includes a constant and the forward discount. The difference between columns (d) and (e)
is that for the latter the exchange rate within the band has been included as an additional
regressor. Although x, is far from significance for both currencies, we report the results for this
regression, because, in order to construct estimates for our variables of interest, we prefer to use
the same regression specification for both the risk premium and the exchange rate within the
band [as suggested by equations (8a)-(8c)]. For the FfrIDM the forward discount does not enter
significantly, but for the Iira~DM it does (at a 5"~0 level). This suggests the presence of a time-
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varying risk-premium for the IiralDM. The significantly positive estimate of the coefficient of
the forward discount indicates that if the forward rate is above the current spot rate ( which is the
case for most of the time), then for being certain about the price at which they can sell liras for
Deutsche Marks at maturity date, agents pay a risk premium. The risk premium is quite sizable:
if the forward discount is 0.5"~0 (6"~0 on an annual basis), the risk premium is almost 2.So~o on an
annual basis (taking into account the estimate for the constant).
6. Estimates of expected rates of depreciation, realignment and devaluation
In this section, adjustments of interest rate differentials in order to construct estimates of
our variables of interest, both under UIP and when UIP is relaxed, are shown and discussed. To
get a clearer idea about the magnitude of these adjustments, figures for the Ffr~DM have all been
plotted on the same scale; similarly for figures for the Iira~DM.
Figures 2(a.l) and 2(b.l) depict the one-month interest rate differential between France
and Germany, respectively between haly and Germany. Here, and in the sequel, plotted variables
are in percentages on an annual basis. Under UIP, the expected rate of depreciation equals the
interest rate differential. For most of the time the French-German interest rate differential is
fairly flat. However, especially the period from the beginning of 1981 until the realignment in
March 1983 seems to be one of serious crises in the Ffr~DM. To a lesser extent this is also the
case for the period around the realignment in April 1986. For Italy, the interest rate differential
has more peaks, although not such an extreme one as the French~German peak in March 1983.
Still it is clear, except for Italian-German differential in the second half of 1981, that the most
turbulent periods in both currencies coincide. This coincides with the ex-post observation that the
majority of the realignments of the IiralDM and the FfrIDM were joint ones. The observation
that the peaks in the interest rate differentials for both exchange rates are less pronounced for
later years in our sample, is consistent with the fact that at more recent realignments the
exchange rate itself did not jump so much.
Unconditional estimates of expected rates of depreciation within the band are shown in
Figures 2(a.2) and 2(b.2), while conditional (on the absence of a realignment) estimates are
shown in Figures 2(a.3) and 2(6.3). The underlying specifications include a constant [for the
unconditional estimates; Tables 1(a) and (b), columns (c)] or dummies [for the conditional
estimates; Tables 2(a) and (b), columns (c)], the exchange rate within the band, and the forward
discount. For the unconditional estimates, the latter variable has a strong influence on the
estimates, as shown by the large and negative peaks which coincide with the peaks in the
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Figure 2(a.2): Estimated unconditional expected depreciation rate of Ffr~DM
within its band. Specification: Table 1(a), column (c).
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Figure 2(a.3): Estimated expected depreciation rate of Ffr~DM within its band, conditional
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Figure 2(b.l): One month interest rate differentialliralDM.
Figure 2(b.2): Estimated unconditional expected depreciation rate of lira~DM within its
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Figure 2(b.3): Estimated expected depreciation rate of IiralDM within its band,
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Figure 2(b.4): Estimated risk premium Iira~DM. Specification: Table 3(b), column (e).
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interest rate differential. As already explained, this effect disappears if one conditions on the
absence of realignments.
Figures 2(a.4) and 2(6.4) plot constructed estimates of the risk premium for respectively
the Ffr~DM and the liralDM. Again the underlying specifications [Tables 3(a) and (b), columns
(e)] include a constant, the exchange rate within the band and the forward discount. For the
FfrIDM the estimated risk premium is small and more or less constant over time. More
interesting are the estimates for the risk premium in the Iira~DM, which are clearly non-
negligible, and have pronounced peaks during periods of crises (second half of 1981 till March
1983; also prior to the realignment in April 1986). Hence, increases in the risk premium indeed
coincide with periods of unrest, which have often been followed by a realignment. During later
years in our sample the risk premium seems to have decreased on average, although it would be
interesting to see how its estimates would behave during the turbulent months September and
November ]992.
Under UIP the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate equals the interest rate
differential. When UIP is relaxed, estimates of the expected rate of depreciation can be
constructed by subtracting risk premium estimates [Figures 2(a.4) and 2(6.4)] from the interest
rate differential [Figures 2(a.l) and 2(b.])]. In particular for the IiralDM this adjustment is non-
trivial. Estimates for the expected rate of realignment under UIP are obtained by subtracting
unconditional estimates of the expected rate of depreciation within the band [Figures 2(a.2) and
2(6.2)] from the interest rate differential. The adjustment is important, especially for [he FfrIDM,
where peaks in the interest rate differential get even more pronounced. The reason is that under
U[P the interest rate differential prior to realignments should be of the same order of magnitude
as the jump in the exchange rate, while the estimated expected rate of realignment should
corcespond to the jump in the centra! parity, which is usually larger than the jump in the
exchange rate (note that the exchange rate within the band jumps back at realignments). Outside
periods of crises, adjustment of interest rate differentials for the estimated expected rate of
depreciation within the band is also important. For most of the time during these periods the
expected rate of realignment is below the interest rate differential. When UIP is relaxed, in
addition to the estimated expected rate of depreciation within the band, one has to subtract the
estimated risk premium [Figures 2(a.4) and 2(b.4)] from the interest rate differential. Again, the
latter adjustment is in particular important for the IiralDM, and it is usually of the same order of
magnitude as the adjustment for the estimated expected rate of depreciation within the band
only. Construction of estimates for the expected rate of devaluation is along the same lines as for
the expected rate of realignment.
Imperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia in the EMS 51
7. Summarv and conclusions
[n this chapter we have shown for the FfrIDM and the IiralDM how estimates for the
expected rates of depreciation, realignment and devaluation can be constructed ( under UlP and
when UIP is relaxed) by non-trivial adjustments of interest rate differentials. These estimates
give an indication about the development of the credibility of the exchange ra[e system, which
has again become a problem of major concem, as the events in September and November 1992
show.
Estimates for our variables of interest are obtained by using estimates of the expected
rate of depreciation within the band, both unconditional and conditional upon no realignment,
and estimates of the risk premium. [t turns out that for both the unconditional and conditional
expected rate of depreciation within the band, the current exchange rate position in the band is
an important explanatory variable, while for the unconditional expected rate of depreciation
within the band, the forward discount plays an important role also, especially for the FfrIDM.
The results suggest the presence of a small and almost constant risk premium for the FfrIDM
and a time-varying, sometimes sizeable, risk premium for the IiralDM. Here the forward
discount captures a large part of the time-variability. On the other hand, for none of the
exchange rates, the position in the band seems to contribute to the explanation of the risk
premium, contrary to what one might have expected. Estimates of the risk premium are also
interesting in their own right, because they give an indication of the credibility of the exchange
rate band, and the costs associated with a lack of credibility.
Appendix: The data
The data are daily from March 13, 1979 till May 16, 1990. They are taken from a
database created by Andrew Rose from BIS data. It is used and described by Flood, Rose and
Mathieson (1991). We use spot exchange rate series, which are recorded at daily 'official
fixing'. The interest rates are annualised bid rates for 1 month Euro-market bills at around l0am
Swiss time. Assuming C[P [equation (2)], forward rates are constmcted from interest rates and
exchange rates. This is motivated by the fact that the interest rates are offshore rates and
therefore not subject to capital controls.
There are a number of missing observations (in our terminology, any Monday,..., Friday,
with no observation recorded, counts for a missing observation). An observation of a variable,
which is constructed from other variables, will be missing, if at least one of the source variables
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is missing in this period. In absence of any missing observations, the total number of
observations would have been 2917.
Chapter 4:
Intramarginal Interventions, Bands and the Pattern of
EMS Exchange Rate Distributions
1. Introduction
The seminal article of Krugman (1991) was the first to explicitly analyse the effects of
exchange rate bands on exchange rate behaviour. However, as a modeling vehicle for the
European Monetary System (EMS), there is strong evidence that it fails to account for a number
of stylised facts, of which the most important is the evidence on the empirical distributions of
most EMS exchange rates in their bands. These unconditional distributions tend in practice to be
hump-shaped, with most of the probability mass concentrated inside the band, while theory
predicts on the basis of the Krugman (1991) model that these distributions should be U-shaped,
i.e. with a large concentration of probability mass close to the boundaries (see Svensson, 1991a).
For example, Bertola and Caballero (1992) present empirical evidence about the hump-shaped
feature of the distribution of the French franc against the Deutsche Mark (the Ffr~DM rate) for
the period April 1979 - December 1987. They offer an explanation which is based on repeated
realignments of the exchange rate and also provide empírical evidence on interest rate
differentials, which at times indicate expectations of future realignments.
We argue, however, that for the Netherlands, for the period April 1983 - November
1991, and for the other EMS countries, for the period February 1987 - November 1991, offshore
interest rate differentials with Germany show quite a different pattem. On average, they have
decreased dramatically compared to the preceding period, indicating a strong increase in the
credibility of the exchange rate bands. Still, the empirical distributions of the exchange rates
against the Deutsche Mark continue to be hump-shaped. This is, in particular, the case for the
Dutch guilder against the Deutsche Mark (Dfl~DM), which is generally considered as the most
credible exchange rate in the EMS. The reason for choosing these particular sample periods is
that they are prolonged periods in which realignments did not occur', and it was generally
believed that the exchange rate bands were becoming more and more credible. This belief was
expressed by statements of EMS govemments never to devalue again and by the progress on
' Except for a change in the central parity of the Italian lira on January 8, 1990. However, this was a
special case, because it occurred when the bandwidth of the lira was reduced from tóo~o to t2.25o~0.
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plans for a Economic Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) (e.g., the Delors Committee, 1989).
Our period of investigation ends just prior to the Maastricht Summit in December 1991z,
because it was precisely at this moment, when criteria were negotiated for participation in an
EMU, that doubts rose about the eligibility of a number of countries to participate in an EMU.
These doubts were reinforced by political difficulties in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
(witness the Danish vote) and the recent successful speculative attacks on the Italian lira and
pound sterling. There is thus a potential danger that the whole Treaty, including the agreements
on an EMU, will never be ratified.
It is thus not clear that the explanation of the hump-shaped feature of unconditional
exchange rate distributions offered by Bertola and Caballero (1992) is appropriate for the sample
periods that we consider, mainly because the anticipation of repeated realignments did not seem
to be much of an issue prior to Maastricht. We offer therefore an alternative and realistic
explanation of the observed hump-shaped distribution of the exchange rates, which is based on
the presence of intramarginal interventions (i.e. monetary accommodation within the band). See
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) for a discussion of the empirical relevance of intramarginal
intervention during earlier periods of the EMS.' To have an interesting role for intramarginal
interventions, we allow for transitory unemployment caused by nominal price and wage inertia.
Our analysis is conducted within the context of a stochastic version of the Dornbusch (1976)
overshooting model, following the Miller and Weller (1990) extension of Krugman (1991), with
shocks to aggregate supply. Hence, three realistic features are added to the Krugman (1991)
modeL (i) home and foreign products are imperfect substitutes in consumption so that purchasing
power parity is relaxed, (ii) prices and wages are sluggish, and (iii) there are intramarginal as
well as inframarginal interventions in the foreign exchange market.' Most of the existing work
on nominal exchange rate bands lacks these features. Many studies, for example, assume
' Even though the Dfl'DM rate does not show any yualitative difference in behaviour for the period
after that.
' Lewis (1990) analyses a specific type of intramarginal intervention (i.e., at each point in time there
is a non-zero probability that the Brownian motion of the fundamental is stopped) within [he context of a
monetary model with purchasing power parity and full employment.
" Apart from being based on more realistic features, i.e. price sluggishness and intramarginal
intervention, this way of modeling has other advantages as well. The presence of sluggish prices and,
therefore, of temporary unemploymen[, allows one to study the [rade-off between price variability and
variability of employment under an exchange rate band (see chapter 5). Moreover, if one allows for
imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, one can study the effects of a band on [he real
exchange rate (see also Miller and Weller, 1990, 1991).
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purchasing power parity.' If there is a unique relationship between the exchange rate within the
band and its fundamental, there are two factors contributing to the explanation of the hump-
shaped feature of the exchange rate distribution: the shape of the exchange rate solution in terms
of the fundamental (on which the explanation of Bertola and Caballero (1992) is basedb), and
mean-reversion in the fundamental. Our proposed explanation is based on a combination of both
these factors.' The objective of this chapter is thus to show that mean-reversion introduced by
sluggish adjustment of prices and wages combined with a degree of intramarginal intervention
can resuli in a hump-shaped exchange rate distribution and thereby explain the empirical
evidence. We show that the hump-shape is more likely to occur when the degree of monetary
accommodation is close to what is needed to peg the nominal exchange rate (so that the
fundamental has to move far away from its mean for the exchange rate to reach its boundaries).
We thus argue that hump-shaped distribution functions for EMS exchange rates may be due to
EMS countries engaging in intramarginal as well as inframarginal interventions.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we document the empirical
puzzle. Section 3 presents our model. In section 4, we first consider, as a benchmark for
comparison, the case of an unrestricted dirty floa[ without a nominal exchange rate band. In
section 5, we analyse the effects of a nominal exchange rate band. In section 6 we explain how
` Krugman's (1991) minimalist stochastic specification can be derived from a monetary model of
exchange rates where purchasing power parity and full employment prevails (e.g., Froot and Obstfeld,
1991; Svensson, 199Ia). However, it can also be interpreted as the reduced form of a target zone model
with imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and an upwazd-sloping aggregate supply
schedule (see Sutherland, 19926).
6 Bertola and Caballero (1992) show that if realignment risk is strong enough, the standard S-shaped
exchange rate solution tums into an inverted S-shape which is steeper near the boundaries than azound the
central parity. With a process for the fundamental, which is (conditional on the money supply) uniformly
distributed in its band, this leads to a concentration of the probability mass of the exchange rate around its
central parity.
' Lindberg and S6derlind (1992) allow for repeated realignments and mean-reverting intramarginal
interventions and generate a hump-shaped pattern for the exchange rate distribution as well. The
disadvantage of their model is that it assumes purchasing power parity and that net cumulated
interventions will be non-stationary (due to velocity being Brownian motion). In our analysis, even though
cumulative interventions can reach any level with positive probability, the global stability of the model
ensures that borrowed reserves can always be paid off in the future. Delgado and Dumas (1991) introduce
mean-reversion in the uncontrollable part of the fundamental. The difference with Lindberg and Sbderlind
(1992) is that the mean of the mean-reverting fundamental process shifts (in the opposite direction of the
movement of the uncontrollable part of the fundamental) when intervention takes place. Hence, the
relationship between fundamental and exchange rate in the band is non-unique. The implications for the
unconditional exchange rate distribution still need to be worked out. For narrow bands, it might well be
the case that the tendency for mean reversion is so strong, if net accumulated interventions are nonzero,
that, for most of the time, the exchange rate settles near the edges of its band, which would result in a U-
shaped unconditional exchange rate distribution (a similar reasoning applies to the Miller and Weller,
1991, model with continuous interventions at the boundazies; see footnote IS).
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the hump-shaped feature of exchange rate distributions can be reproduced and provide an
illustration based on Monte Carlo simulations. In section 7 we summarise the results and offer
suggestions for further research.
2. Empirical evideoce tor EMS exchange rates
As already mentioned in the previous section, we will study the EMS exchange rates
against the Deutsche Mark for the subperiod February 1987 - November 1991. However, we
study the DflIDM rate for a somewhat longer period, i.e. April 1983 - November 1991.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show one-month offshore interest rate differentialse against the
position of the French franc~Deutsche Mark (Ffr~DM) rate in its band for the subperiods March
1979 - January 1987 and Febrvary 1987 - November 1991, respectively. Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
do the same for the Dfl~DM rate for the subperiods March 1979 - March 1983 and April 1983 -
November 1991, respectively. The area be[ween the pairs of diagonal lines is the set of
combinations of exchange rate position in the band and interest rate differential for which the
predicted future exchange rate does not lie outside the current band, i.e. under the assumption of
uncovered interest parity the sum of the interest rate differential plus the deviation of the current
exchange rate from central parity must be within the f2.25o~0 or }bo~o band. Going from [he early
EMS to the more recent EMS subperiod, for both countries interest rate differentials with
Germany have decreased dramatically on average. In fact, this effect is even stronger (although
not visible in the figures) towards the end of the more recent EMS subperiod. For the other EMS
countries the pattem of change of interest rate differentials is similar (the corresponding figures
have been omitted to save space). The second outstanding feature for France is that the positive
correlation between the position of the nominal exchange rate in the band and the interest rate
differential, which is clearly present during the early EMS subperiod (as is also reported by
Bertola and Caballero, 1992), has vanished during the more recent EMS period. For other coun-
tries we have been unable to detect a clear correlation between the interest rate differential and
the exchange rate position for either of the two EMS subperiods.
Figures 3 and 4 show, for the more recent EMS subperiods, kernel estimates of the
unconditional density functions of the FfrIDM and DflIDM rate, respectively, in their bands.9
Both estimates clearly indicate a concentration of probability mass in the interior of the band.
B We use daily observations. Interest rate differentials are computed from spot and forward exchange
rates under the assumption of covered interest parity.
9 The choice of the kemel was based on the standardnormal density function, while the choice of the
window width was based on minimizing the mean integrated square error (e.g., see Silverman, 1986).
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Figure 1(b): Danger realignment FfrIDM rate
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Figure 3: Unconditional density estimate Ffr~DM rate
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Although not shown here, other EMS exchange rates show a pattem for the unconditional
exchange rate density function which is roughly similac Hence, despite the fact that interest rate
differentials have largely been eliminated during the more recent EMS subperiod thus indicating
a significant decrease in devaluation risk, the hump-shaped pattem of the empirical distributions
of the EMS exchange rates in their bands continues to be present, both during the early and the
more recent EMS subperiods. This suggests that the explanation offered by Bertola and
Caballero (1992) might be less relevant for the more recent EMS subperiod (April 1983 -
November 1991 for the Dfl~DM, February 1987 - November 1991 for the other exchange rates).
3. Transitory unemployment in a small open economy
Most of the existing work on nominal exchange rate bands is based on Krugman (1991),
and adopts the unrealistic assumptions of purchasing power parity and fully flexible wages and
prices, and thus assumes full employment. Notable exceptions are Miller and Weller (1990,
1991), who extend Krugman (1991) to a stochastic version of the familiar exchange rate
overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976), thus allowing for sluggish price movements and
imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods in consumption. Our model of a small
open economy extends Miller and Weller (1990) to allow for different types of nominal
exchange rate regimes, each one of them characterised by a particular feedback rule for the
money supply. In particular, in section 4, when we introduce a nominal exchange rate band, we
extend Miller and Weller (1990) by allowing for intramarginal accommodation and intervention
in the foreign exchange market. Our model may be summarised by the following equations:
y-- r) (i - rz) t S(e t P- P), r1~0, O~s~1, (1)
m-p-y-~,i, Á70, (2)
dp -~(y - yF~t } ndt t ódz, dz-IN(O,dt), ~~0,





where m, y, yr, p, p', e and dz denote logarithms of the nominal money supply, the level of
aggregate demand, the full-employment level of output, the home price level, the foreign price
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level, the nominal exchange rate (price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency units) and a supply shock, respectively, i and i denote the home and foreign nominal
interest rate, respectively, and n denotes the rate of core inflation.
The home country specialises in the production of a good with price p and the foreign
country specialises in the production of a good with price p. There is imperfect substitution
between home and foreign goods. Equation (I) is the IS-curve and shows that aggregate demand
increases when the real interest rate declines or the real exchange rate depreciates. The real
interest rate is simply the nominal interest rate minus the core inflation rate. Equation (2) is the
LM-curve and says that the velocity of circulation increases with the nominal interest rate.
Equation (3) is the Phillips-curve, which shows that inflation in wages and producer prices
occurs when there is excessive demand for goods, and that deflation occurs when there is
unemployment. The speed at which the labour market clears, i.e the degree of price and wage
flexibility, corresponds to the parameter ~. For convenience, the full-employment level of output
is assumed to equal ~,i' (i.e. y~-7,,i').'o Supply shocks (z) follow a Brownian motion and cor-
respond to positive shocks to nominal wages; z follows an independent Wiener process with zero
mean and instantaneous standard deviation equal to 6. Producer prices are a constant mark-up on
unit labour costs, so that supply shocks may be interpreted as negative shocks to labour
productivity. The money supply is stable in steady state, so core inflation (n) being the trend rate
of inflation is zero." Equation (4) is the uncovered interest parity condition. Risk-neutral
arbitrage ensures that an interest differential in favour of the domestic country can only be
sustained if the cutrency is expected to depreciate in the future, i.e. if the currency is currently
over-valued. Finally, equation (5) is the feedback rule for money supply in response to price
changes. All exchange rate regimes considered in the sequel are characterised by a special case
of this feedback rule for monetary policy.
'o This guarantees that in steady state, i.e. when the expected change in the price level and the
exchange rate is zero, nominal money supply and the price level are both equal to lt (see equation (6)]. It
also ensures that, if there is full monetary accommodation, i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule (see subsection
4.2), the real exchange rate is pegged, other real variables are constant as well, and expected price and
nominal ínterest rate changes are zero.
" The advantage of this simple specification is that one can unambiguously determine that the system
is saddlepath stable. If aggregate demand depends on the real consumption interest rate, i.e. the nominal
interest rate minus the rational expected rate of change in the CPI, there is a possibility of an unstable
spiral (i.e. higher inflation depresses the real interest rate, boosts aggregate demand and thus induces even
higher inflation). Our definition of core inflation in the definition of the real interest rate avoids these
indeterminacies and simplifies the algebra.
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4. Unrestricted dirty float: The case of no band on the exchange rate
To facilitate comparison with a regime in which an exchange rate band is present, we
first consider the case of an unrestricted dirty float. Hence, there is no exchange rate band and
the money supply rule is linear:
m-kta(P-Fr)-(1-a)NtRP, R~I. (6)
This feedback rule says that, when prices exceed their long-run value p(i.e. the exogeneous
component of the money supply), the monetary authorities accommodate and raise the money
supply. The degree of monetary accommodation is given by the coefficient R. The advantage of
such a simple rule is that it is easily understood by the market.
For simplicity, and without any loss of generality, we normalise all foreign variables to
zero. Altematively, we could redefine all domestic variables as deviations from their steady
state. Using (6), the reduced form equations of the model under a dirty float are given by:
dP - ~(r)t~,)-' {-[S~tq(1-R)]ptS~,etr)(t-R)lx}dt t ódz,
E,de - (rlt~,)-'[(1-[~S) p t S e-(1-(3) p] dt.
(~)
(g)
The price Ievel is a predetermined, backward-looking variable, whilst the exchange rate is a non-
predetermined, forward-looking variable which jumps if private agents suddenly anticipate a
change in future policy. The rational expectations equilibrium must therefore be a stable
saddlepath solution. This requires one eigenvalue with a negative real part and one eigenvalue
with a positive real part, which is ensured as long as (3~1 holds. To find the unique, non-
explosive rational expectations solution, we postulate a linear saddlepath:
e - mean(e) - ai [p - mean(p)] (9)
where mean(p~mean(e}-p. Upon substitution of (9) into (7) and ( 8) and equating coefficients
on p, we find:




In fact, there is another solution for cu as well. However, that solution can be ruled out because
it dces not satisfy the requirement that the adjustment of prices along the saddlepath is a stable
process.
Figure 5: Dependence of the saddlepath slope (c,~) on the degree of monetary
accommodation ((3) and the degree of labour market flexibility (~).
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Figure 5 illustrates the dependence of co on both the degree of monetary accommodation
(3 and the degree of labour market flexibiliry ~. The slope ca of the saddlepath increases if the
coefficient of monetary accommodation ( R) increases.'Z For low degrees of monetary
accommodation, i.e. (3~1-5, there is a negative corcelation between the nominal exchange rate
and the price level, i.e. the saddlepath slopes downwards. 7his implies that the nominal
exchange rate overshoots in response to an unanticipated and pennanent change in the long-run
money supply tt (cf, Dombusch, 1976). For high degrees of monetary accommodation, 1-S~(3~1,
the saddlepath slopes upwards, which implies undershooting of the nominal exchange rate. The
turning point between overshooting and undershooting of the naminal exchange rate in response
to an unanticipated permanent change in the money supply corresponds to the coefficient of
'Z If p-1-S, then w-o. If R-1 and ~~.51, then w-L If p-0 and S?~á, w~-1.
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monetary accommodation that ensures a fixed nominal exchange rate (i.e. p-1-S), so that w-0.
This nominal exchange rate regime will be referred to as a peg.
It is easy to see that for p~l-S, w is increasing in ~, while for 1-S~(3~1, w is decreasing
in ~. Therefore, as ~ increases, the relationship between w and (3 pivots around the peg ((3-1-5)
towards the horizontal axis. In the extreme case of a classical model with full employment (i.e.
tb---~oo), w~0 and all transitional dynamics disappear.
4.1. Special case: fiYed exchange rates
Under a peg the monetary authorities use unsterilised interventions to fix the exchange
rate. If the foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic interest rate, there is an incipient capital
outflow and pressure for the currency to depreciate. Under a peg, the central bank defends the
exchange rate by selling foreign reserves and buying its own currency. As a result, the money
supply falls until the domestic interest rate is pushed up to the level of the foreign interest rate.
Hence, a peg corresponding to e-eP implies that the domestic interest rate is anchored to the
foreign interest rate, and that an independent domestic monetary policy is infeasible:
m-(1-S)ptSer-R(P-k)}k.
Hence, a peg at e-eP cortesponds to a very specific (linear) money supply rule, namely an
accommodation coe~cient of (3-1-5 and a long-run component of the money supply of p-eP.
Upon substitution of these results in (7), we find that prices follow an Omstein-Uhlenbeck
process (Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p.172):
dp--~S(p-eP)dt}adz (12)
which is a mean-reverting process. Clearly, the asymptotic mean of this process is
mean(p)-p-eP.
4.2. Clean.Jloat versus PPP exchange rate rule
Other special cases are zero monetary accommodation ((}-0), which will be referred to
as a clean jloat and inter alia always implies exchange rate overshooting, and, at the other
extreme, full accommodation (~3-1). Under a clean float the monetary authorities do not give in
to wage and price demands and thus keep the nominal money supply fixed, while with full
accommodation they accommodate all wage and price shocks. It is easy to see that in the latter
case all transitional dynamics are eliminated and that the real exchange rate is fixed at zero.
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Hence, IOOo~o monetary accommodation corresponds to a rule which ensures that the domestic
interest rate is pegged to the foreign interest rate, that the real exchange rate is fixed (p'tep-0)
and thus that employment and output are at their natural rates. This special case (~I) is also
referred to as a PPP exchange rate rule ( e.g. Dornbusch, 1982; Alogoskoufis, 1991)", and
induces non-stationarity in the nominal price level and exchange rate (var(p), var(e) ~ oo).
4.3. Unrestricted dirryfloat
More general degrees of monetary accommodation correspond to a situation in which
deviations of prices from their steady state are partially accommodated (0~(3~1-5 or 1-S~p~l)
and will be tertned an unrestricted dirty jloat. The exchange rate adjusts instantaneously to
ensure equilibrium on the balance of payments, but nevertheless some intramarginal intervention
in the foreign exchange market occurs.
The steady state corresponds to the mean of the asymptotic distributions. In the long run
relative purchasing power parity holds and money is neutral, independent of the monetary
accommodation coefficient ((3). However, in the short run the qualitative properties of the
rational expectations equilibrium depend very much on the coefficient of monetary
accommodation ((3).
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate for low, respectively, high degrees of monetary
accommodation the adjustment of the exchange rate along the saddlepath. The full-employment
locus requires, in the absence of shocks, stable prices ( dp-0) and is steeper than 450, because its
slope (lfq(1-~3)(~,S)"') is greater than unity. A]o~o increase in the price level reduces aggregate
demand through an appreciation of the real exchange rate and through a contraction of real
money balances, hence to ensure full employment the exchange rate must depreciate by more
than lo~o. The effect on real money balances is less when the accommodation coefficient is high,
so that as~3 increases the full-employment locus becomes flatter and tilts towards the 450 line.
The interest-parity locus requires that the market expects a stable exchange rate (E,de-O). An
increase in the price level induces on the one hand a monetary contraction and an increase in the
interest rate, less so if there is a high degree of monetary accommodation, and on the other hand
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the interest
rate. The latter (fotmer) effect is more likely to dominate when p is high (low), in which case a
" A higher degree of nominal exchange rate indexation gives more stability in the real exchange rate
and the levels of demand and employment, but on the other hand it amplifies the effects of wage
disturbances and other supply shocks on prices. Alogoskoufis (1991) extends Dombusch (1982) by
highlighting the effects of monetary and exchange rate accommodation on the forward-looking behaviour
of wage- and price-setters, and suggests that more persistence in inflation may arise from a higher degree
of accommodation in floating exchange rate regimes.
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Figure 6: Adjustment along the saddlepath under a dirty float after an unanticipated
increase in the long-run component (p) of the money supply.
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depreciation ( appreciation) of the exchange rate is required to push up (depress) the interest rate
back to the foreign rate. More precisely, the slope of the interest-parity locus (-(1-(3-S)~S) is
negative for low degrees of monetary accommodation ((3~1-5), whilst it is positive and less than
unity for high degrees of monetary accommodation (~1-S).
An increase in the exogeneous or long-run component of the money supply ( p) induces
overshooting ( cf, Dombusch, 1976) of the exchange rate for low degrees of accommodation
((3~1-5). The market expects an interest rate differential in favour of abroad and thus over time a
gradually appreciating exchange rate, so that the exchange rate must on impact over-react.
However, for large coefficients of monetary accommodation (1-S~(3~1), the exchange rate
undershoots on impact. A gradual increase in prices is accompanied by a gradual expansion of
the money supply, so that the anticipated gradual rise in interest rates is less pronounced.
Consequently, the exchange rate depreciates less and the interest rate falls less on impact thus
leading to undershooting rather than overshooting of the exchange rate.
5. Dirty tloat with a nominal excóange rate band
As already mentioned, one of the crucial elements in the explanation of the observed
hump-shaped distributions of EMS exchange rates within their bands is the presence of
intramarginal interventions in the foreign exchange market. Hence, below we introduce a band
on the exchange rate and to capture the presence of intramarginal interventions we allow for a
non-zero coefficient of monetaty accommodation (R), cf. the rule (6), if the exchange rate is
inside the band. We assume, for ease of notation, that the long-run component of the money
supply is zero (i.e. ~-0). In order to solve for the exchange rate solution within its band, we
postulate instead of the linear saddlepath solution (9) a[wice differentiable function for the
solution:
e - S2 (p). (9')
Use of Ito's Lemma, dS2 - S2' dp t 'fz a2 S2" dt, yields a second-order nonlinear differential
equation:
~~ a2 ~~~(P) f~(rlt~)~~ {-~S~ttl(1-a)) P f S~ i2(P)} ~~(P) -
(~~-~)~' [(1-s-R) P } s ~(P)l - o. (13)
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This equation yields a time-invariant relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the
price level. Note that there are only two linear solutions, which correspond exactly to the stable
and the unstable arm of the saddlepath solution of the unrestricted dirty float discussed in section
4. These linear solutions are, of course, not compatible with the presence of finitely wide
nominal exchange rate bands.
To solve for the exchange rate when it is inside the band, it is necessary to specify the
nature of the interventions undertaken by the monetary authorities when the exchange rate
reaches the boundaries of its band. The band on the nominal exchange rate consists of an upper
bound (e") and a lower bound (e~). The authorities ensure that the exchange rate does not move
outside this band by imposing thresholds p"-S2"'(e") and p~-S2-'(e~) on the price level (the
"fundamental"). We focus only on exchange rate solutions symmetric about the origin by
notmalising the central parity to zero and assuming that p"--p~ (so that e"--e~~0). If the price is
between p" and p,, the exchange rate is inside its band and the degree of monetary
accommodation or intramarginal intervention to price changes is R, while, beyond these
thresholds, the degree of accommodation switches to the one (i.e. 1-S) that is needed to keep the
exchange rate fixed at the upper, respectively, lower boundary of its band (see subsection 4.1).
The complete description of the money supply rule which supports this policy is given by the
following piecewise-linear monetary accommodation rule~", which is sketched in Figure 7:
m- Rp, for P"~P~P~ if 0~[3~1-5 and p~~p~p" if 1-S~(3~1,
m-(1-S)p f Se~, for p~~ if 05(3~1-5 and p~~ if 1-SQ3~1,
m-(1-S)p t Se", for p~r' if OSp~I-S and p?p" if 1-S~(3~1.
(14)
Note that (14) makes use of S2'~0 for O5(3~1-5, and 52'~0 for 1-S~(3~1, which correspond to an
inverted and a regular S-shaped solution of S2(.), respectively [see Figure 8(a)]. The switch
points p"-S2"'(e") and p~-S2"'(e~) follow implicitly from the smooth pasting conditions, which
" This piecewise-linear specification does not allow intramarginal interventions to depend on how
close the exchange rate is to the edges of the band. Allowing for this complicates the solution without
changing the qualitative features of the analysis much.
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Figure 7: Money supply rules under a nominal exchange rate band.
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are the appropriate boundary conditions (cf Miller and Weller, 1990).15'6 If the price level
crosses p" (or p~) from the interior of its band, the nominal interest rate differential, i.e. i-i',
jumps from a negative (positive) value to zero. Hence, the monetary authorities have to imple-
ment a discrete contraction (expansion) of the nominal money supply in order to raise (depress)
the interest rate and prevent the exchange rate from moving outside its band. Because the market
anticipates this regime switch at the boundaries of the band, the exchange rate solution bends
and becomes horizontal as the economy approaches the boundaries. This is what is known as the
"honeymoon effect".
6. Reproduction of the stylised pattern of EMS exchange rate distributions
6.1. An explanation for Jhe hump-shaped pattern
In this section we explain how sluggish wage~price movements and intramarginal
interventions within a nominal exchange rate band combine to offer a potential explanation for
the observed hump-shaped pattern of EMS exchange rate distributions. lt is important to
understand how the monetary accommodation coefficient ((3) and the degree of labour market
flexibility (~) affect the shape of the solution of the exchange rate in terms of the price level and
the degree of inean-reversion of the economy.
Let us first investigate how the shape of the exchange rate solution is affected by
changes in parameter values, in particular by the degree of intramarginal accommodation ((3) and
the degree of labour market flexibility (~). Figure 8(a) shows, for given ~~0, the exchange rate
solution for various degrees of monetary accommodation ((3) within the band. For a low degree
of accommodation, 0~(3~1-5, S2'~0 and thus p"~p~, so that the exchange rate solution is an
inverted S-shape. The point is that very low prices induce an expansion of the real money supply
15 In Miller and Weller (1991) the band is sustained by infinitesimal adjustments of the money supply
if the exchange rate reaches the boundaries of its band. However, irrespective of the amount of cumulated
intervention, the exchange rate always returns inside its band if the price movement reverses after
intervention. This intervention policy implies a non-unique relationship between the price Ievel and the
exchange rate, namely one that depends on the current level of money supply. Although the implications
for the unconditional distribution of the exchange rate in its band still need to be worked out further,
Sutherland (1992a) suggests that the distribution is U-shaped rather than hump-shaped. The intuition is
that changes in the money supply, as a result of interventions, temporazily change the long-run equíli-
brium consistent with the current level of money supply. Hence, the exchange rate solution in the band
shifts and becomes relatively steep in the middle of the band. Combined with the global mean-reversion
in the price level, this implies a concentration of probability mass near the edges of the band.
16 Although it is not possible to obtain a closed-fonn expression for all solutions to differential
equation ( 13), one can characterize the solutions qualitatively (cf Miller and Weller, 1989). It follows that
there is a unique solution in the band which fulfills the smooth pasting conditions ( for 1-S~(i~l this is
guaranteed if ~151). For 05p~1-S the solution is downward sloping and for 1-S~Q~I it is upward sloping.
It is strictly concave in the upper half of the band, and strictly convex in the lower half of the band.
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Figure 8: Exchange rate solutions and price bands.
(a) Solutions (e-S2 (p)) and the degree of intramarginal accommodation ((3)
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and thus a depreciation of the currency, possibly forcing it beyond the upper bound. For high
degrees of accommodation, 1-S~(3~1, the upper bound e" translates into an upper bound on the
price level, p~~0, and the exchange rate solution has a regular S-shape. The inward shift in the
LM-curve arising from high prices is now attenuated by accommodation, but the IS-curve shífts
back a lot. The result is an incipient interest rate differential in favour of the foreign country and
pressure on the curcency to depreciate on impact, possibly forcing it outside the band.
Thus, increasing the degree of intramarginal intervention from a low value (OSR~I-S),
increases the gap between the switch points p" and p~, beyond which the exchange rate is
pegged at the boundaries of its band, as the solution for the exchange rate becomes flatter. The
width of this gap goes to infinity if one approaches the point at which the exchange rate is
pegged ((~l-S). Increasing the coefficient of intramarginal accommodation further, beyond 1-S
towards full accommodation, the bandwidth for the price level again monotonically decreases
from infinity. The relationship between the coefficient of intramarginal accommodation ((3) and
p~-S2"'(e") is depicted in Figure 8(b).
Section 4 showed that an increase in labour market flexibility (~) causes the saddlepath
to become more horizontal, i.e. its slope increases when O~R~I-S and its slope decreases when
1-S~(3~1. With a band on the nominal exchange rate, this means that the implied gap between
the price limits, beyond which the exchange rate is held on the boundaries of its band, increases.
Finally, note that both a higher variance ( a2) and a higher value of the semi-elasticity of
the demand for money with respect to the interest rate (~.) induce a stronger honeymoon effect.
For a higher variance, the intuition is that the expected time towards stabilisation of the
exchange rate at its boundaries is shortec The prospect of future stabilisation strengthens the
exchange rate now when it is in the upper half of its band, and weakens the exchange rate when
it is in the lower half of the band. Similarly, a higher value for ~, adds to the forward-looking
character of the solution and increases the response of the current spot exchange rate to changes
in the expected rate of change in the future (cf. Krugman, 1991). Hence, the imminent
stabilisation at the boundaries of the band has a stronger stabilising effect on the exchange rate
now.
The extent of inean-reversion of the system is directly affected by the degree of labour
market flexibility. It is therefore instructive to see first what happens in case of complete wage
and price rigidity (i.e. ~-0). Prices then follow a Brownian motion. The reduced-form equation
for the exchange rate has a similar format as in Krugman (1991):
e - ~(R}S-1)iS] P } ~(1-P)iS] Ft } ~(Tlf~,)~S] E,(de)Idt. (15)
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The band on the exchange rate translates into a band on the fundamental f-[((3tS-1)(S] p t[(I-
a)~S] ft, with limits f~S2-'(e~) and f"-S2"'(e"). At its boundaries the authorities use infinitesimal
adjustments of ft, while inside the band, for given lt, there is intramarginal intervention, which
again takes the fotm of monetary accommodation of price shocks. As a function of the
fundamental (f), the solution for the exchange rate has the familiar S-shape. Hence, for given ft,
the exchange rate decreases in the price level if OSp~I-S and increases in the price level if 1-
S~(3~1. However, as Svensson (1991a) has shown, a fundamental which is a Brownian motion
(without drift) in its band, is unifotmly unconditionally distributed in its band. Hence, under
complete price rigidity (~-0), the exchange rate distribution in its band must be U-shaped. To
explain the empirical puzzle, one thus needs some degree of wage and price flexibility (i.e.,
~~0). It is easy to see that both under an unrestricted dirty float and under a peg the degree of
mean-reversion increases in ~, because the (negative) root of the reduced fotm system [equations
(7) and (8), respectively (12)], which determines the expected speed of the economy to its long-
run equilibrium, decreases in ~. However, in order to see how the degree of inean- reversion is
affected by a change in labour market flexibility (~) if there is a band on the nominal exchange
rate, the nonlinearity of the exchange rate solution forces us to resort to Monte-Carlo
simulations.
6.1. Monte-Carlo srmulation results
Because we do not have analytical closed-form solutions for the unconditional exchange
rate distributions when there is a band on the exchange rate, we use Monte Carlo simulations to
reproduce the hump-shaped pattern of the EMS exchange rate distributions. Details about the
simulation procedure can be found in appendix B of chapter 5. The choice of parametervalues is
determined by the considerations outlined above. Given the variance (aZ), which determines the
overall variability of the system, one needs an accommodation coefficient ((3) which is close
enough to 1-S, and at the same time a degree of labour market flexibility ( ~) which is not too
small. Various experiments suggest that there is a wide range of parameter values consistent with
a hump-shaped pattem of the exchange rate distribution. Moreover, we conjecture that for a
given degree of labour market flexibility (~~0), it is always possible to choose (3 so close to I-S,
that the implied bandwidth for the price level (i.e. the gap between p, and p`~) becomes so large
that the percentage of time that the exchange rate is at its boundaries is negligible. In our
simulations reported here we have set a-0.1, ,1-5-~.-~h. We also assume a symmetric exchange
rate band of t2.25o~0, which is the bandwidth of EMS exchange rates."
" Except for the Italian lira before 8 January 1990, when the bandwidth was }6"~0.
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Figure 9: Simulated unconditional exchange rate distributions under a band.
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Figure 10: Simulated unconditional distributions of the interest rate differential
under an exchange rate band.
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Figure 9 portrays simulated distributions1e of the nominal exchange rate. In the cases of
no intramarginal intervention [Figure 9(a); (3-0, ~-0.5] and almost full accommodation (Figure
9(b); (3-0.98, ~-0.5], the gap between the switch points p~ and p" is relatively small, so that the
exchange rate distribution is U-shaped. However, if R is close to 1-S, the combination of a large
gap between p~ and p" and the mean-reversion induced by the (sluggish) wagelprice response to
excess demandlsupply, leads to an exchange rate distribution which is hump-shaped [Figure 9(c);
~0.46, ~-0.5]. As expected, the hump-shaped pattern is more pronounced for the higher degree
of labour market flexibility. In the case where ~-1 and (~0.46 [Figure 9(d)], the simulated
distribution clearly resembles the empirical distribution of the DflIDM rate giving support for the
view that De Nederlandsche Bank engages in a fair amount of intramarginal interventions as
well as trying to keep the guilder inside its band.
Figures 10 shows simulated unconditional distributions of the interest rate differential for
the same combinations of R and ~. When the degree of intramarginal accommodation is far from
I-S, the exchange rate spends a relatively large part of the time on the boundaries of the band
where the interest rate differential is zero. This explains the sharp contrast between the amount
of probability mass in the middle class of the his[ograms and the other classes, when [3-0 and
(~0.98. When p is close to I-S, the distributiori has a hump-shaped pattem, which becomes
more concentrated around zero if goods and labour markets are more flexible. In fact, the
empirical distributions of the interest rate differentials in the EMS generally also have a hump-
shaped character.
7. Concluding remarks
Following Bertola and Caballero (1992), we have provided additional evidence of an
empirical puzzle conceming EMS exchange rates, namely that the stylised pattern of their
empirical distributions tends to be hump-shaped rather than U-shaped, as predicted by the
standard target zone model. Our evidence is based on the subperiod April 1983 - November
1991 for the Dutch guilder and the subperiod February 1987 - November 1991 for the other
exchange rates against the Deutsche Mark. During these periods the EMS exchange rate bands
were relatively credible, as may be witnessed from the interest rate differentials. Hence, for this
period, the explanation offered by Bertola and Caballero (1992) seems less appropriate as it is
based on expectations of repeated realignments. We have offered an altetnative explanation
1e The reason why we present the simulated distributions as histograms, is that they have a mixed
discrete-continuous nature, because in the long-run distribution there is a positive probability that the
exchange rate is exactly located on its boundaries. Of course, for (i "close to I-S", the relative amount of
time spent at the boundaries of the band is negligible.
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which is valid even when there is no probability of realignment. Our explanation is based on the
combination of two realístic features, namely that wages and prices are not fully flexible and that
there are intramarginal interventions.
As shown by the interest rate differentials with Germany, the credibility of the exchange
rate bands has increased a lot during the more recent EMS period under consideration. Although
close to zero on average, interest rate differentials were still positive. Moreover, there still
seemed to be some noise in the relationship between the position of the exchange rate in the
band and the interest ra[e differential, which may indicate a slight residual (s[ochastic)
devaluation risk. Hence, future research may combine the expectations of realignments stressed
by Bertola and Caballero (1992) with the combined effects of price sluggishness and
intramarginal interventions. This extension may benefit from recent work by Svensson (1991a,b)
and Bertola and Svensson (1990). Such a richer framework will help to understand the hump-
shaped pattern of exchange rate distributions during earlier periods in the EMS and the more
recent period we studied, as well as the very recent speculative attacks on the Italian lira and the
British pound that forced these currencies to leave the EMS.
Chapter 5:
Exchange Rate Bands and Macroeconomic Stabilisation
1. Introduction
The seminal article of Krugman (1991) was the first to explicitly analyse the effects of
exchange rate bands on exchange rate behaviour. The main result of the article is that even in
absence of intervention now, the exchange rate is stabilised in its band because of the prospect
of future interventions at the boundaries to defend the band. This results in the familiar S-shaped
relationship between exchange rate and fundamental. The standard Krugman model and its many
extensions have been explored thoroughly in the literature. For example, Froot and Obstfeld
(1991) note that Krugman's model corresponds to a stochastic monetary model of a small open
economy with perfectly flexible nominal wages and prices, full employment, uncovered interest
parity and purchasing power parity. Svensson (1991a) shows that for narrow exchange rate
bands, the asymptotic or unconditional variance of the interest rate differential (between two
countries and at instantaneous maturity) increases in the bandwidth, but for wide bands it
decreases in the bandwidth. The instantaneous interest rate differential variability is perfectly
negatively correlated with the instantaneous exchange rate variability and increases
monotonically when the exchange rate band is narrowed, which is in sharp contrast with a fixed
exchange rate regime and, therefore, zero interest rate differential.
Although the implications of the standard Krugman model and its extensions have been
documented in relatively great detail, the question what the effects are of exchange rate bands on
important economic variables such as output, employment and prices, and, related to this, what
the effects are on welfare, is largely unanswered. An exception is Klein (1990), who introduces
shocks to aggregate demand for goods and money supply in a classical model, and shows that a
more narrow band on the nominal exchange rate should lead to greater stabilisation of nominal
and real exchange rates and output. Gros (1990) studies optimal stabilisation in a one-period
model with a standard surprise supply function, imperfect substitution of domestic and foreign
goods, fully flexible prices and a variety of real and monetary shocks. Authorities use fiscal and
monetary policy to stabilise output and to keep the exchange rate in a band. A band is defined in
a'probabilistic' sense, namely that the probability that the exchange rate should be kept between
its boundaries is above a certain threshold level. This implies a'soft' target zone, with
intramarginal interventions only. Unfortunately, there can be no case for an exchange rate band,
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because imposing a band involves an additional restriction under which the stabilisation problem
is to be solved. If authorities can make unrestricted use of both monetary and fiscal policy, then
an exchange rate band does not induce any welfare losses, so thai both the income and exchange
rate target can be met (in the sense that income is stabilised to the maximum possible extent,
while at the same time the exchange rate restriction is fulfilled). However, if fiscal policy is
restricted, then it might be the case that imposing a band involves welfare losses. Sutherland
(1992b) uses a similar model to address the question of the optimal width of a target zone. In his
article, a target zone is defined in the 'conventional' way, as a hard band on the nominal
exchange rate, with interventions at the boundaries. It is found that from a stabilisation point of
view, in the presence of velocity shocks or aggregate demand shocks only, a target zone cannot
be optimal. However, in the presence of a combination of these two types of shocks, a target
zone might be preferred to both a fixed exchange rate and a free float. The same is tme for
aggregate supply shocks when authorities care about both output and price stability.' Svensson
(1992b) also uses a classical model with purchasing power parity and an exogenously deter-
mined output level to study the trade-off between various objectives, such as exchange rate and
interest rate variability around certain target levels and smoothing short-run exchange rate and
interest rate movements. Given these objectives, authorities choose the optimal (time-consistent)
path for the nominal money supply in response to a variety of shocks. The optimal width of the
exchange rate band, which is informally defined as a range of t3 standard deviations around the
unconditional mean of the exchange rate, follows implicitly from the optimal stabilisation
policy.Z
One of the main reasons that the welfare effects of exchange rate bands are largely
unexplored is that in most of the models the unrealistic (e.g., see Dombusch, 1987) assumption
of full price flexibility is made, which implies purchasing power parity and hence full
employment, so from the viewpoint of macro-economic stabilisation, one may as well have a
peg or one currency and reap all the benefits of an optimum currency area.
' Because accumulated shocks are assumed to follow a Brownian motion, by imposing a band on the
fundamental, of which the unregulated part is a linear combination of accumulated shocks, the money
supply becomes non-s[ationary. Moreover, output and prices are non-stationary, so that their asymptotic
variances do not exist and, therefore, cannot be used as a criterion for optimal policy optimisation. As an
altemative criterion. Sutherland (1992b) uses unconditional ( on the position in the band) expectations of
instantaneous variances. No[e that there is no active stabilisation policy when the exchange rate is in the
interior of its band.
` Abstracting from an explicit band on the exchange rate is necessary to avoid considerable analytical
problems with the model. Svensson (19926) conjectures that this simplification should not have dramatic
effects on the results, because in the presence of intramarginal interventions the non-linearity of the
exchange rate solution is only significant close to the boundaries and this is precisely where the
unconditional exchange rate distribution has relatively little probability mass.
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Miller and Weller (]990, 1991) extend the analysis to allow for sluggish nominal wage
dynamics and transitory unemployment. Within this richer environment, one is able to
distinguish between real and nominal exchange rates. Moreover, in the presence of nominal
wage sluggishness and, therefore, transitory unemployment, one wonders whether the central
bank has an interest in monetary accommodation of wage and price shocks. Dornbusch (1982)
and Alogoskoufis (1991) examine the effects of monetary accommodation, and of PPP exchange
rate rules in particular', on macroeconomic stability in a framework of dirty floating. Frenkel
and Aizenman (1982), Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) and others discuss the optimal degree of
monetary accommodation and fixity of exchange rates when there is a variety of shocks.
However, no work has been done on the effects of monetary accommodation with a nominal
exchange rate band.
Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to relax the assumptions of purchasing power
parity and full employment prevalent in most of the literature on exchange rate bands, by
allowing for imperfect substitutability between home and foreign goods and by introducing wage
and price sluggishness, and to analyse the effects of monetary accommodation on the exchange
rate, the interest rate, producer and consumer prices, unemployment and output under a variety
of exchange rate regimes, in particular, by comparison with the case of an exchange rate band.
The other regimes we consider are a pegged exchange rate, a clean float (zero accommodation),
a PPP exchange rate rule (full accommodation) and the more general unrestricted dirty float.
Typically, for low degrees of monetary accommodation output variability is lower and price
variability is higher under a band than under a dirty float, while the opposite is the case for high
degrees of accommodation.
Given a welfare loss function which is a weighted sum of the asymptotic variances of
the consumption price index and output", this chapter then analyses what the optimal degree of
monetary accommodation and bandwidth are. Typically, a peg, a clean float or a PPP exchange
rate rule are sub-optimal relative to a more general unrestricted dirty float. An unrestricted dirty
float is the limiting case of an exchange rate band when the bandwidth goes to infinity. [n a
' Increased nominal exchange rate indexation ensures more stability in the real exchange rate and the
levels of demand and employment, but on the other hand it amplifies the effects of wage disturbances on
prices. Alogoskoufis (1991) extends Dombusch (1982) by highlighting the effects of monetary accommo-
dation and exchange rate accommodation on the forward-looking behaviour of wage-setters and price-
setters, and suggests that the higher degree of persistence in inflation arises from a higher degree of
accommodation in floating exchange rate regimes. For the model discussed in this chapter, the PPP
exchange rate rule corresponds to 100"~o monetary accommodation of price and wage shocks.
" This is an important difference with Svensson (19926), who is mainly concemed with the trade-off
between exchange rate and interest rate variability, but not with the trade-off between output and
(consumer) price variability.
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first-best world, the question of the optimal bandwidth is still unsolved, although, so far, Monte
Carlo simulations have not shown a case for a finite bandwidth, which corresponds to a piece-
wise linear money supply rule. However, in a second-best world, in which the authorities are
restricted to a particular (for example, zero) degree of intramarginal accommodation, an
exchange rate band may be preferred to a dirty float, depending on the weight authorities attach
to consumer price stability.
Because the model in this chapter is the same as the one used in the previous chapter,
we refer to section 3, chapter 4, for the presentation of the model and the notation, to section 4,
chapter 4, for the discussion of the various exchange rate regimes in absence of an exchange rate
band, and to section S, chapter 4, for the solution of the exchange rate under a band. The
remainder of this chapter is then as follows. Section 2 studies unconditional variances of output,
nominal and real exchange rates, interest rates and producer and consumer prices both for
different degrees of monetary accommodation and for different widths of the exchange rate
band, including an infinitely-wide band (i.e., an unrestricted dirty float). In section 3 optimal
stabilisation policy is analysed when there is a trade-off between the variability of output and
consumer prices (a 'second order Phillips curve'). Subsection 3.1 considers the case of an
unrestricted dirty float. The optimal degree of accommodation to price shocks is high when the
authorities care relatively more about full employment than price stability. More flexible labour
markets induce right-wing governments to have a lower optimal accommodation coefficient, i.e.
move towards a cleaner float, and induce left-wing governments to have a higher optimal
accommodatíon coefficient, i.e. move towards a PPP exchange rate rule. Subsection 3.2 analyses
optimal stabilisation policy, when authorities are also allowed to impose a band on the exchange
rate. Section 4 concludes this chapter.
2. Asymptotic variances
As already mentioned in section l, we use the same model and the same notation as in
chapter 4, except that we define an additional variable q, the consumer price index (CPI), by q-
(1-a)p t a(p~te), O~aS'l2. Hence, the CPI is a weighted average of domestic goods prices and
foreign goods prices ( expressed in home currency units). The share of imports in total
expenditures corresponds to a.
In this section we study asymptotic or unconditional variances of prices, output, interest
rates and nominal and real exchange rates, first for an unrestric[ed dirty float (subsection 2.1),
then for an exchange rate band ( subsection 2.2). In particular, we will investigate how variances
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depend on the degree of monetary accommodation of price shocks. For an unrestricted dirty
float, appendix A gives expressions for the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of
the price level. Given that along the saddlepath other variables are linear functions of the price
level, it is straightforward to obtain expressions for their conditional means and variances as
well. Appendix A also gives an expression for the unconditional variance of inflation over a unit
time interval.
2.1. Unrestricted dirty float. The case of no band on the exchange rate
With a linear accommodation rule of the type given in equation (6), chapter 4, prices
follow an Omstein-Uhlenbeck process (e.g., see Karlin and Taylor; 1981) along the saddlepath:




var(e) - wz var(p),
var(efp' p) - (1-w)Z var(p),
cov(e, p) - cu var(p),
var(9) - [1-a(]-~)]~ var(p),
var(v) - f[S~,(1-co)t~(1-R)]~(~lt7v)}~ va~)
var(i) - {[1-~S(1-cu)]~(rl}~,)} ~ var(p).






Under a peg, asymptotic variances do not depend on rl and ~,, the semi-elasticities of aggregate
demand for domestic goods and demand for money with respect to the nominal interest rate,
because under a peg, the nominal interest rate is fixed as well (given that the world interest rate
level is constant). Obviously, the expected speed of inean-reversion towards the steady state
increases [see equation ( 12), chapter 4] and, therefore, variances of output and prices decrease
with the degree of labour market flexibility ( ~). If aggregate demand is more sensitive to relative
82 Chapter S
prices (higher S), then the variance of output is higher, but the variance of the price level is
lower.
Since c,t increases in [3, it is clear that var(p) monotonically increases in [3 [Figure I(a)).
In fact, with full accommodation of price shocks ([3-1), i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule, var(p)
tends to infinity. It is also straightforward to establish [hat the variance of the CPI increases with
the degree of accommodation [Figure )(b)].5 Furthermore, the variance of the CPI is always less
than the variance of the producer price because w~l. The variance of output decreases
monotonically [Figure 1(c)] in (3 and is zero when there is full accommodatíon of price shocks,
i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule.
Figures 1(d~l(f) illustrate how the other variances depend on [3. In order to assess the
robustness of these patterns, we computed variances for a wide range of parameter combina[ions,
while varying (3 from 0 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01 for each of these parameter combinations.
Values for a and a were respectively 0.25 and 0.1. For each of the parameters ~, ~ and r) we
chose 3 values, namely 0.1 ('low'), 0.5 ('benchmark') and 0.9 ('high'). For S we chose two
differen[ values, 0.5 and 0.9.6 For all possible parameter combinations (54 in total) we found
that the qualitative character of the variances was as depicted in Figures 1(d)-1(f). Figure 1 is
based on the benchmark parameter combination with ~-S-r)-~-0.5.
Typically, the variance of the nominal exchange rate [Figure I(e)] first decreases with
the accommodation coefficient, but once a peg has been reached it inereases with the accommo-
da[ion coefficient. In fact, var(e) tends to infinity when all price shocks are fully accommodated
and a PPP exchange rate rule is in place. Obviously, var(e~0 for a peg ([~l-S). The variance of
the real exchange rate [Figure 1(f)] typically declines with the accommodation coefficient and is
only zero when there is full accommodation of price shocks and a PPP exchange rate rule ([3-1).
For low degrees of monetary accommodation, there is a negative correlation between nominal
exchange rates and producer prices, whilst for high degrees of monetary accommodation there is
a positive correlation, which increases with the degree of accommodation. The variance of
nominal interest rates [Figure 1(d)] is zero both when there is a peg and when a PPP exchange
rate rule in place. For other degrees of accommodation, var(r) is positive.
` This is ensured íf a(I-o~)~I, which, on its tum, is ensured if S?1~2 and a5112 (i.e., the share of
goods produced abroad does not exceed the share of domestically produced goods in the domestic
consumption package).
' b?0.~ ensures that oi?-I and, therefore, that var(q) is strictly increasing in R.
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If goods and labour markets are completely rigid (tp-0), then producer and consumer
prices, output and nominal and real exchange rates are non-stationary, while the nominal interest
rate is zero. On the other hand, when the degree of labour market flexibility tends to infinity
(~~~), all variances and covariances tend to zero.
2.2. Dirty~loat with a nominal exchange rate band
To study the asymptotic unconditional variances when there is a band on the exchange
rate, it is necessary to resort to Monte Carlo simulations of the model ( see Appendix B), because
it is not possible to obtain an analytical closed-form solution for the exchange rate solution
inside the band. Authorities now have two instruments, the width of the exchange rate band and
degree of intramarginal intervention (3. ln fact, a dirty float can be seen as the limiting case,
when the width of the exchange rate band goes to infinity. Simulations have been conducted for
bandwidths around zero of }2.250~0 (corresponding [o the majority of the EMS exchange rates)
(e) Vaàance of the nominal exchange rate (f) Vaàance of the real exchange rate
0.03
unrest. dirty float
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and t6"~o (corcesponding to the Italian lira, British pound, Spanish peseta and Portuguese
escudo'), and for degrees of intramarginal interveniion varying from zero (no intramarginal
intervention) to almost full ((~0.99) accommodation in the band.
The dependence of asymptotic variances on the degree of intramarginal accommodation
(3 for different bandwidths is illustrated in Figure l, together with the limiting case of an
unrestricted dirty float, which has already been discussed in the previous subsection. As before,
parameter values for these figures are 6-0.1, a-0.25, ~-S-r1-7~-0.5.
Because part of the time the exchange rate is floating inside the band and part of the
time it is fixed at the edges of its band, it is not surprising that in most cases variances lie
between the values they have under an unrestricted dirty float with degree of accommodation (3
and the values they have under a peg. In particular, because under a dirty float producer's price
variability is monotonically increasing in (3, for 0~(3~1-5 it is higher under a band than under a
dirty float, while for 1-S~(3~1 the opposite is true [Figure 1(a)J. Similarly for the variance of CPI
[Figure I(b)] and the variance of the real exchange rate [Figure 1(f)]. Because the variance of
output is monotonically decreasing in (3 under a dirty float, for 05j3~1-S it is lower and for 1-
S~(3~1 it is higher under a band than under a dirty float (Figure 1(c)]. The variance of the
nominal exchange rate [Figure I(e)] under a band is less than the variance under a dirty float,
both for low values of (3 (p~l-S) and for high values of (~ (1-S~(3~1). Of course, this is reflects
the presence of the 'honeymoon' effect, which mitigates the response of the exchange rate to a
change in the producer's price. As expected, if the width of the exchange rate band increases,
variances under a band approach the corcesponding variances under a dirty float (compare the
variances under a t2.25oIo band with those under a tóo~o band).
The variance of the nominal interest rate differential decreases to zero when p increases
from zero to ]-S, both under a dirty float and under a band regime. Increasing (i further, under a
dirty float the variance first increases and then decreases again to become zero as one
approaches the full accommodation rule ((~l). However, for the case of an exchange rate band,
var(i) approaches a positive value when (3-~l (note that under a band PPP and full employment
do not hold anymore when (~-~I). Under full accommodation, the variance of the interest rate
differential first increases and then decreases as the bandwidth increases, and finally is zero for
an infinite bandwídth.
Mussa (1986) noticed that for many countries the volatility of real exchange rates
declines as the volatility of nominal exchange rates declines. Obviously, this phenomenon can
only be explained within the context of a Keynesian model with nominal wage sluggishness.
' tn fact, on 8 lanuary 1990, the band on the lira was narrowed down from t6"~o to }2.25"~0. At the
moment, however, both the Italian lira and the British pound have (temporarily?) left the EMS.
86 Chap[er 5
Figures 1(e) and 1(f) illustrate that this stylised fact can be explained when (3~1-5, i.e. for low
accommodation coefficients a reduction in the bandwidth is accompanied by a reduction in the
variance of the real as well as of the nominal exchange rate. However, for high accommodation
coefficients a reduction in the bandwidth raises the variance of the real exchange rate.
3. Optimal stabilisation policy
To address the question which exchange rate regime is preferred from a stabilisation
point of view, we assume that the monetary authorities minimise the following welfare loss
function:
W- va~Y) } Y v~9), Y~~, (~)
where W denotes the welfare loss.8 More conservative and more independent central bankers are
likely to care relatively more about CP[ stability rather than full employment and thus have a
higher value of y.
3.1. Optimal monelary accommodation under an unrestricted dirtvlloat
In this subsection we confine ourselves to linear accommodatíon rules of the type in
equation (6), chapter 4. Hence, there is no band on the exchange rate.
It can be shown that both var(p) and var(q) are increasing and strictly convex in (i, while
var(y) is decreasing and strictly concave in p. This guarantees that there is a unique value for R
((3~1), which minimises the welfare loss function in (2) and which decreases with the relative
weight y attached to CPI stability. In addition, it is easy to show that the trade-off between
var(y) and var(p), obtained by varying (3, is convex.
It is useful to have Figure 2 which shows the policy frontier characterising the trade-off
between the variance of employment and the variance of the CPI (a 'second-order asymptotic
Phillips-curve'). Very right-wing authorities who attach an extremely high weight to CPI stabili-
ty find a clean float ((?-0) optimal. In general, it is optimal to have a dirty float.
Because there is no band on exchange rate, along the stable saddle-path output and CPI
are linear functions of the producer's price, and, therefore, both var(y) and var(y) are scaled up
by a factor aZ. Hence, the optimal value of j3 is independent of the value of 6. This property is
" In the sequel, we assume that p is zero. The long-run component N of the nominal money supply
determines nominal prices and the nominal exchange rate m the steady state. Authorities, however, are
concerned with reducing the variability of transitory deviations of output and prices from their steady state
values.
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Figure 2: Trade-off output-CPI variability under various bandwidths.
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~- PPP rule ((3~1)
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~
clean float ((3 - 0)
0.000 i
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100 var(y)
what is referred to as certainty equivalence and no longer holds once there is a band on the
exchange rate.
For 'right-wing' authorities who choose 05(i~l-S, the optimal accommodation coefficient
decreases in the degree of labour market flexibility ~, while for 'left-wing' authorities, who
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choose 1-S~p~l, the optimal degree of accommodation increases in ~.910 The former case
suggests that right-wing govemments view a more flexible labour market as a reason for a
cleaner float, whereas the latter case suggests that left-wing governments view this as a reason
for moving towards a PPP exchange rate rule. Clearly, when wages and prices immediately
adjust to ensure full employment (~~m) var(y), var(p) and var(q) tend to zero so that the degree
of monetary accommodation (as long as it is not complete, i.e. p~l) is irrelevant and the specific
nature of the nominal exchange rate regime does not matter.
An increase in the share of foreign goods in the consumption basket (a) decreases CPI
variability (given that var(e)war(p) must hold when 05(3~1 and a~~k), but does not affect
output variability. It is therefore clear that the optimal accommodation coefficient ((3) increases
in the degree of exposure to intemational trade (a).
3.2. Optimal monetary policy under a dirty fToat with a nominal exchange rate band
Compared to the case of an unrestricted dirty float ( subsection 3.1), authorities now
choose the optimal width of the exchange rate band jointly with the optimal degree of
accommodation inside the band. Hence, they choose the optimal money supply rule among the
set of piece-wise linear accommodation rules which are compatible with a band on the exchange
rate.
As we have seen, the presence of an exchange rate band corresponds with a piece-wise
linear monetary accommodation rule. In the absence of forward-looking variables, a standard
result from the literature (e.g., Davis, 1977, Chapters 5 and 6) is that within the class of linear
dynamic models ( that are stabilisable and detectable) and quadratic preferences, it is not optimal
to have a nonlinear policy rule. Here, the optimisation problem is complicated by the presence of
the exchange rate, which is a forward-looking or jump variable. Although the accommodation to
price changes is linear when the exchange rate is in the interior of its band, the dynamics of the
system are non-linear, because of expectations of future regime switches. Therefore, in a first-
best world, the question of the optimal bandwidth is still a mute problern, although none of the
a Fomially, we can only prove this if var(p) replaces var(q) in the welfaze loss function, but for all
parameter combinations considered in subsection 2.1, it was found that for right-wing authorities (who
choose 05p~1-S) the optimal p decreased in ~, while for left-wing authorities (who choose I-S~p~l), the
optimal (3 increased in ~.
'o The reason is that as ~ increases, the ratio var(q)war(y) increases when OS(i~l-b and decreases
when 1-S~p~l.
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Monte Carlo simulations performed so far, have shown a case for an exchange rate band."
Figure 2 confirms that the policy frontier corresponding to an unrestricted dirty float lies entirely
below the ones corresponding to an exchange rate band and gives an idea of these losses. As the
bandwidth approaches infinity, the policy frontier approaches the one corresponding to an
unrestricted dirty float. If the bandwidth goes to zero, the policy frontier reduces to a point, i.e.
the point corresponding to a pegged exchange rate. In fact, all the policy frontiers go through
this same point irrespective of the bandwidth.
Despite the fact that there might be no case for a band, one can phrase a second-best
question: What are the reductions in welfare losses one can achieve with having a finite
exchange rate band given that one is restricted to a given degree of monetary accommodation a,
which can only be changed if i[ is for the purpose of defending a band? This question is
relevant, for example, when the authorities are not allowed to accommodate to price shocks
(except when they are defending a band), in which case there is also no intramarginal
intervention ([i-0). Figures 1(b), 1(c), and 2 provide an answer.
Figure I(c) plots the variance of output against the accommodation coefficient for
various bandwidths. When the accommodation coefficient corresponds to the value of a peg, the
bandwidth is irrelevant. As already explained in subsection 2.2, the various plots pivot around
[3-1-5, and become more horizontal for more narrow bands. This reflects the fact that var(y)
under a band is approximately a weighted average of its values under a peg and under a dirty
float. For low (3 (0~[~~l-S) the variance of output is smaller under band than under a dirty float,
while for high [3 (1-S~(3~1) it is higher under a band.
Figure I(b) shows a similar picture for var(q) versus a for various bandwidths. Now, for
low degrees of accommodation (0~[3~1-5), the variance of the CPI under a band lies above its
value under a dirty float, while the opposite is true for high degrees of accommodation (1-
S~(3~1). Again, the plots pivot around [3-1-5. When the bandwidth becomes smaller, var(q)
increases for low and decreases for high levels of accommodation. The plots for var(p) [Figure
I(a)] aze qualitatively the same, except that var{pvvar(q) for all values of (3.
If the authorities can only use a little accommodation in between the boundaries ((3~1-5),
one expects that the higher the weight authorities attach to CPI rather than output stability (i.e.,
the more 'right-wing' authorities are), the lower the chance that they wish to impose a narrow
exchange rate band. Figures 1(b), 1(c) and 2 confirm this, because under an unrestricted dirty
float or a wide band the variance of output is higher and the variance of the CPI is lower than
" Of course, it may be possible to make a welfare case for exchange rate bands on credibiliry rather
than on stabilisation grounds but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here it is assumed that
authorities can commit themselves to simple accommodation rules, which can be readily understood by
private agents.
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under a narrow band. These figures also show that, with high degrees of accommodation, an
unrestricted dirty float or a wide band leads to less volatility of output and more volatility of the
CPI. In that case, right-wing authorities are more likely to impose a narrow exchange rate band.
Figure 2 shows the policy frontier under a t2.25o~o and a tbo~o band. In a sense,
increasing accommodation when (3~1-5 is like reducing the bandwidth, and when ~l-S it is like
increasing the bandwidth. In particular, for a given value of R below (above) 1-S, a reduction in
bandwidth depresses ( raises) var(y) and raises ( depresses) var(q).
4. Concluding remarks
In this chapter we studied a small open economy under a dirty float. We analysed the
optimal degree of monetary accommodation and showed that it increases when the relative
weight on employment rather than on CPI stability increases. More flexible labour markets
induce right-wing governments to move towards a cleaner float and left-wing govemments
towards a PPP exchange rate rule. A clean float, a peg or a PPP exchange rate rule are seldom
optimal. This chapter also extended the Miller and Weller (1990) model to allow for monetary
accommodation of price shocks within the band. An interesting feature, which has been
extensively discussed in chapter 4 is that when the accommodation coefficient approaches the
value corresponding to a peg, the unconditional density function of the exchange rate is hump-
shaped rather than U-shaped. This finding explains a stylised fact of EMS exchange rates which
cannot be explained with the classical Krugman (1991) model or the more Keynesian Miller and
Weller (1990, 1991) model, because these studies do not allow for intramarginal interventions.
For low values of the accommodation coefficient, the model can also explain a stylised fact
commented on by Mussa (1986). that is as the exchange rate band narrows the variance of both
the real and the nominal exchange rate diminish.
[n the context of the present model, the case for an exchange rate band in a first-best
world is a mute problem, although depending on preferences of the authorities, there are second-
best situations in which a band may be preferred to a dirty float. A direction for future research
is to investigate whether a welfare case for exchange rate bands can be made on credibility
rather than on stabilisation grounds. Such an analysis may trade off the benefits of an exchange
rate band in terms of enhanced credibility (cf, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988) against the costs of a
potentially reduced scope for stabilisation.
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Appendix A: Extensions for an unrestricted dirty float
A. l. Conditiona! mean and variance of ~he prrce level
Expressions for conditional means and variances under an unrestricted dirty float can be
obtained with the help of Karlin and Taylor (1981). Along the saddlepath, the producer price
follows the process,
dp --W(p -~t) dt f a dz,
where W - ~(qtl)-~[Sl(I-co}trl(1-[3)]. Hence,
E[p(tfs) ~ p(t)-x] - mean(p) [1-exp(-y~s)] f x exp(-iys), s~0,
Var[p(tfs) ~ p(t)-x] - [I-exp(-2yis)] var(p), s~0.
A1. Varrance of inJlation
As far as inflation is concerned, with the aid of Bergstrom (1984, pp. 1154-1155), one
Itas for the asymptotic variance of the producer price inflation over a unit time interval:
var(Op) - var[p(t)-p(t-I)] - 2 [I-exp(-W)] var(P) - [1-eXp(-W)]6'~W
Clearly, when labour markets clear instantaneously, var(4p)-2var(p).
Appendix B: Monte Carlo simulations
The simulation technique is based on Duffie and Singleton (1988). Prior to simulation,
the second-order ordinary differential equation (13), chapter 4, is solved numerically for the
function S2(p). Given roughly 200 points of this function between the boundaries of the band,
intermediate points were found using linear interpolation of the two nearest points. Third-order
polynomial interpolation (Davis and Rabinowitz, 1975) yields results that are hardly different. To
simulate the structural continuous-time model, it must be discretised. The parameter values that
have been chosen correspond to a unit time interval. First, given p„ e, and a draw from the
normal distribution for the additive shock, p,,, can be calculated as a linear combination of these
three variables [cf. eq.(7), chapter 4]. Second, one can calculate e,,,-f2(p,,,) from the numerical
solution of S2(p). It is straightforward to calculate the simulated values of other endogeneous
variables as well.
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Clearly, this discretisation is much too coarse and estimates of asymptotic variances
based on this discretisation are inconsistent. Better approximations are obtained if the model is
simulated at a higher frequency. Hence, in practice each unit of time is divided into n parts and
n in-between simulations are performed over each of the T unit time intervals. Of course, the
parameter values are adjusted to allow for the higher sampling frequency. Similarly, the variance
of the shocks is adjusted to allow for the higher frequency, i.e. a!n replaces a. Although more
sophisticated schemes are available, a simple first-order Euler scheme has been used in the
simulations presented in this chapter. Duffie and Singleton (1988) show that consistent
estimation of the variances of the variables requires a minimal ratio nIT, at which both n and T
should go to infinity.
The set-up of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure is as follows. From a long time
series, N series of T observations are drawn, making sure to throw away a number of
observations between subsequent sequences of T observations. A grid of size n is used for the
in-between simulations. [n practice, typical values were n-25, N-10 and T-1000.
If n tends to infinity, the discrete approximation to the continuous-time distribution
becomes exact. Because all variables are defined to have an asymptotic mean equal to zero and
n is chosen to be relatively large, the test statistic
s::? -(xi~1 t x:~2 t... f xT~)IT, i-1,2,...,N
is approximately an unbiased estimator of the unconditional variance of the variable x. Clearly,
sxZ -(st.~Z t s,.~' f... s,.~z)IN
is also an estimator of the unconditional variance of x. The statistic
~(s..~Z-s",')2 t ... f (sFvZ-s.z)ZjI~M-1)j
is approximately an unbiased estimator of the variance of "s,2, given that the number of
observations thrown away between subsequent sequences of T observations is large enough to





Does Inequality Cause Inflation?
The Political Economy of Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt
1. Introduction
Differences in inflatíon rates across countries, even with similar economies, such as
Northern European democracies, are a major puzzle for economists. A standard explanation
originates from the public finance literature. Given the need to finance a given amount of
government revenues, the govemment has the option of financing these revenues either through
(non-monetary) taxes or through seigniorage (e.g., Mankiw, 1987). The optimal revenue mix is
tilted more towards seigniorage if the ruling political party has less of a dislike for inflation, if
the costs of collecting taxes are high and the extent of tax evasion is widespread (cf, Canzoneri
and Rogers, 1990), and if the financial system is relatively repressed (e.g., Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992). Inflation will then be relatively high and income tax rates relatively low. If the
cen[ral bank is not independent and the govemment cannot commit itself to the announced future
monetary stance, discretion rather than rules is the relevant outcome so that seigniorage will be
relatively more important than tax revenues (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Barro, 1983; van der
Ploeg, 1991). Lack of monetary discipline and credibility thus provide an additional incentive for
inflation in a situation of outstanding nominal govemment debt or nominal wage contracts.
These are just the standard economic linkages. So far, however, little attention has been
paid to political explanations for observed differences in inflation rates. To understand the
political economy of inflation and taxation, one must allow for heterogeneity among agents.
Heterogeneity arises when different private agents have different labour productivities and thus
build up different stocks of assets for their retirement. An unequal society means that a relatively
large part of the govemment debt is in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals.
When this society is democratic, it thus elects a political party that represents the interests of
poor people. Such a party has more of an incentive to levy unanticipated inflation taxes and
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erode the real value of debt service, because this hurts the rich more than the poor. It follows
that in a democracy inequality and nominal government debt sow the seeds of inflation.'
Recently, other theories have been put forward which emphasise the relationship between
the degree of political instability and polarisation, and inflation. Cukierman, et aL (1992) test a
political model of tax reform on 79 countries and find that political instability is positively
associated with inflation. Another theory is that of "populist policy cycles", a typical Latin
American way of policymaking, where deep inequality and social unrest sow the seeds for
policies of redistribution and expansion by reactivation. In the longer run, when the economies
run into bottlenecks and foreign reserves get depleted, these policies become unsustainable and
inflation explodes (e.g., Sachs, 1989; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989). Why stabilisation is so
often delayed in reality, even though all parties in a social conflict find stabilisation desirable,
can be explained by "wars of attrition" (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Inflation is high as long as
none of the groups concedes and takes up the (tax) bill of reforrn.
These theories are more appropriate for explaining differences in inflation among non-
democracies, because these countries show larger variations in the degree of polarisation of their
societies and the degree of political instability. They seem, however, less appropriate to account
for differences in inflationary experience among democracies. Thus, the analysis we put forward
in this chapter may be seen as complementary to these other theories.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 establish, within the context
of a public-finance model of tax and seigniorage smoothing with heterogeneous agents, the
proposition that inflation is high in democratic countries with a lot of inequality and high
nominal govemment debt. Although the analysis restricts attention to only one nominal asset
(i.e., govemment debt), in principle this explanation holds for any nominal asset which is
distributed unequally across the electora[e. Section 4 briefly discusses the other recent theories of
inflation mentioned above. Section 5 provides empirical evidence of a positive association
behveen inflation and income inequality for a cross-section of democracies. This associatiun is
robust agains[ the underlying sample period, reverse causation and extensions in which proxies
for political instabílity and polarisation have included. Corresponding regressions for a cross-
section of non-democracies show no evidence of any relation between inflation and inequality.
Section 6 concludes this chapter.
' This result is related to the idea that inequality is harmful for growth (Alesina and Rodrih, I991;
Persson and Tabellini, 1992). The point being tha[, for a society in which wealth is unequally distributed.
the median voter is relatively poor and will levy high taxes on capital and income in order to provide for
transfers from the rich to the pooc Such policies damage growth prospects.
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2. Taxation, seigniorage, government debt and private consumption
For simplicity, attention is focussed on steady streams of primary govemment spending.
In that case one can restrict the analysis to the steady state. The qualitative character of the
results is unaffected if a transient analysis is conducted, because households want to smooth their
consumption over time and the government wants to smooth tax and seigniorage revenues over
time (cf, Barro, 1979; Mankiw 1987). This latter result only holds when the velocity of
circulation of money is constant, because otherwise the govemment has an incentive to finance
permanent increases in government spending by interest on govemment assets built up through
temporary bouts of taxation and inflation (Obstfeld, ]991; van der Ploeg, 1991).
Households consume their income, which consists of income from production plus
interest income minus taxes and seigniorage. Household i thus faces the budget constraint2
C;-Y;t(r-n)D;-T;-S;
where C;, Y;, D;, T; and S; denote consumption, pre-tax income, holdings of government debt,
taxes and seigniorage extracted by the government for household i, respectively, r denotes the
ex-post real interest rate and n denotes the growth rate in output. To make the point of this
chapter as simple as possible, assume that all households receive the same income and pay the
same amount of taxes and seigniorage. For those variables the subscript i can be dropped. The
only source of heterogeneity among households is thus difierences in holdings of assets: some
households hold a lot of govemment debt, whereas other households hold little or no govemment
debt. There are N households. The govemment must finance its primary level of spending plus
interest payments on outstanding debt [hrough extraction of tax and seigniorage revenues:
NGt(r-n)NDA-N(TtS) (2)
where D, -(D,t..tDN)M denotes the average level of govemment debt held by households and
G denotes the exogenous per-capita level of government spending. The condition for equilibrium
in the goods market is
NCAtNG-NY (3)
~ Given that the economy is in a steady state with growth rate n, the household budget constraint is
given by C, - Y,t(ltr)D; D,,,-T; S, - Y,t(]tr)D;(Itn)D,-T,-S„ which simplifies to equation ( 1). In the
sequel we omit the time index.
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where CA -(C,}..tCv)IN denotes the average level of private consumption.
Four behavioural assumptions are needed. First, the ex-ante real rate of interest is
constant, denoted by p, and follows from preferences and technology. It is assumed that p
exceeds the real growth rate n. Second, the Fisherian hypothesis is adopted so that the nominal
interest rate is simply the sum of the ex-ante real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation.
It follows that the ex-post real interest rate is given by
r-ptrz`-~[ (4)
where n and a` denote the actual and expected inflation rate, respectively. Third, the quantiry
theory of money is adopted so that the demand for real money balances is a constant proportion,
say m, of output:
M~P-mQ (5)
where M, P and Q denote per-capita nominal money balances, the price level and the non-
distortionary per-capita level of output, respectively. It follows that the rate of inflation is equal
to the excess of monetary growth over the real growth rate of the economy, that is rt-~PiP-p-n
where It-4Mnvt, and that seigniorage extracted from an individual household is given by
S-p(M~Pr(ntn)mQ. Fourth, the growth rate of the economy, n-~QIQ, is exogenous and there
are output losses arising from taxation and inflation. More specifically, pre-tax income is
assumed to be given by (e.g., Obstfeld, 1991)
Y- Q[1 -'fz x, tZ - 'fi xZ (rttp)Z], x„ xz ? 0 (6)
where t-TIQ denotes the (non-monetary) tax rate. The deadweight losses are quadratic in the tax
and inflation rates. There is no cross term (nt), which is not too unreasonable when the tax
system is indexed to the price level. The non-distortionary tax rate is zero, whilst the non-
distortionary inflation rate is minus the (ex-ante) real interest rate (-p) as the full liquidity rule
says that the nominal interest rate should be driven to zero. The non-distortionary level of
monetary growth is -(p-n).
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3. Unequal distribution of government assets causes in0ation
Households obtain utility from both private and public consumption. Utility of household
i is thus given by CtG. The political party that is elected into office represents the interest of its
clientele, that is the median voter. The government thus chooses monetary and fiscal policy (p
and t) to maximise the utility of the median voter (expressed as a fraction of the non-
distortionary level of output),
~CA1 f GI,Q - (CM - CA } Y)~Q -
I - 'fz xi t'̀ - 'fi xz (Ft}P-n)z } (Ptk`-P-n) (d~ - d.,).
subject to the government budget constraint,
g f(Ptk`-p-n) dn - t} Ft m, (g)
where d-DIQ, g-GIQ and the subscript ti~ denotes the median household as far as the dispersion
of government assets and thus of private consumption is concemed. The gap between the mean
and the median of the distribution of the assets throughout the population is a measure of the
degree of inequality in wealth holdings in the sense that this indicates that few people hold most
of the assets.
3.1. Rules
Two outcomes should be distinguished: mles and discretion (denoted by superscripts R
and o, respectively). Rules presumes that the govemment is able to commit itself or, altema-
tively, has sufficient reputation for the private sector to firmly believe its announcements about
future policy. Under rules the govemment can influence the expectations of private agents and
can thus take 7c`-n or P`-P as given when detennining its optimal monetary and fiscal policies.
It follows that:
tR - (x~mz}xz)-~ xz ~k t (P-n) m] (yl
~.1~ - (K~m~fK,) ~ Ixim k - x: (P-n)~ ~It))
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where k-gt(p-n~A denotes (the annuity value of) the govemment's need for funds. As the
govemment's need for funds increases, it is optimal to raise both the tax and monetary growth
rate (cf., Mankiw, 1987). As a consequence, the inflation rate and seigniorage revenues increase
whilst private consumption falls. An increase in the output costs of taxation arising from a less
efficient tax system or a fall in the output costs of inflation boost the optimal rates of monetary
growth and inflation and reduce the optimal tax rate. A fall in the growth-corrected real interest
rate (p-n) has similar effects, because it raises the non-distortionary level of monetary growth as
given by the full liquidity rule. A more repressed financial system implies that households need
more money balances (higher m) and thus increases the base for raising seigniorage revenues.
This induces a shift in the optimal government revenue mix away from tax towards seigniorage
revenues. Due to the fact that the non-distortionary level of inflation is minus the ex-ante real
interest rate, there is an opposite effect leading to a bias in favour of non-monetary tax revenues.
Finally, note that the rules outcome for the optimal tax and inflatíon rate is independent of the
manner in which assets are distributed throughout the population. The intuition is [hat under
rules the govemment is pre-committed not to levy an unanticipated inflation tax, so that inflation
does not affect the (growth-corrected) real return on assets held by the median voter and thus the
measure of inequality (dA-dM) does not affect the utility of the median voter.'
3.2. The politica! economy ojdiseretion
The rules outcome is time inconsistent in the sense that once the private sector is fooled
into believing that monetary growrth and inflation will be low, the government has an incentive
to levy a surprise inflation tax. By doing this the govemment erodes the real value of its debt
service and can thus reduce the output costs of taxation. In rational expectations equilibrium the
private sector anticipates that the government has such an incentive and thus inflation will be
higher. Discretion may be more relevant in practice, since it is relevant when the government
cannot commit itself to its announced intentions about future policies. Discretion implies that the
government must take n` and it` as given when determining its optimal policies. It follows that:
tn -[x,m(mtdr)tKZI-~ {KZ k t~K: (P-n) -(d..~ - ds,)) ml} ~ tR (1 1)
No - ~K~m(mtdn)tKZI~~ ~K~ (m}dA) k - Kz (P-n) t (dn - dn,)1' kR. (12)
' The term (pfp`-p-n)(d„-d,) in (7) reduces to (p-n)(d,~-d~) under rules, and thus does not depend on
unanticipated or on actual inflation, so that this term and thus the distribution of assets ( as measured by
d,,,-dA) does not affect the optimal outcome.
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Because the govemment has no reputation and cannot commit itself, the private sector does not
believe announcements about low monetáry growth. It follows that under discretion the welfare
of the median voter is lower than under rules and the govemment revenue mix is sub-optimal in
the sense that the tax rate is too low and the inflation rate is too high. Basically, the presence of
government debt provides an open invitation to wipe it out with surprise inflation and thus
lowers the cost of seigniorage.
The distribution of assets matters for the optimal tax and monetary growth rates. The
more unequal wealth is distributed throughout the population, i.e. the more the mean exceeds the
median of the distribution of assets throughout the population, the higher monetary growth and
inflation and the lower the tax rate. The idea is that when assets are very unfairly distributed
throughout the population the median voter is more likely to be poor so that in a democracy the
political party in office will represent the interests of the poorer segments of the population.
Such a party will find it in the interests of its clientele to levy unanticipated inflation taxes in an
attempt to take from the rich in order to lower (non-monetary) taxes for all. Hence, an unfair
distribution of wealth carries the seeds of high inflation.
The government is ex post unable to redistribute from the rich to the poor, given that all
contracts are indexed to the price level, so that both rich and poor are worse off when the
government cannot commit. Utility of household i can be written as
c; t g- I -'k K, t' - 'fz xZ íktP-n)' }(P-n) (d; - dA), (13)
so that rich households have higher utility than poor households. Also, households with identical
holdings of assets experience a higher level of utility under rules than under discretion and their
utility under discretion is higher when assets are more equally distributed in society, ceteris
paribus.
3.3. Intertemporal considerations
The discretionary outcome described above assumes that the government has a zero
commitment period. However, if expected time to replacement of the government is long
enough, other equilibria with lower inflation are possible. These equilibria may be sustained by
trigger strategies (e.g., Rogoff, 1989), where, if the govemment deviates from earlier
announcements of low inflation, it is punished by periods of expectations of high inflation. The
temptation to renege on its earlier promises increases when the government's term of office
comes to an end, and when there is a high probability of replacement.
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To analyse these issues in a proper intertemporal framework, one also needs to allow for
the dynamics of wealth accumulation. Although the median voter may reap the benefits of
expropriation in one period, this will affect the distribution of assets and thus the optimal
inflation rate in ensuing periods (cf, the dynamic analysis of capital taxation by Alesina and
Rodrik, 1991). In particular, the distribution of assets may become more equal and thus the
optimal inflation rate may gradually fall over time. The detailed analysis of the dynamics of the
distribution of asse[s and inflation is lefr for futur~~ r~~ear~h
4. Other recent theories of inflation
Cukiertnan, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) develop a model in which the two political
parties disagree about the composition of government spending and the party which holds tenure
in the curtent period can choose the efficiency of the tax system (which thus becomes a strategic
variable) in the next period. The model predicts that a higher degree of polarisation and a higher
probability of replacement of the cutrent govemment leads to the choice of a less efficient tax
system, so that a larger part of government spending has to come from seigniorage revenues.
Controlling for a set of structural economic variables (in order to proxy for differences in tax
collection costs), seigniorage as a percentage of total government revenues is found to be
positively related to a variery of proxies for policital instability and polarisation.
Other explanations of (temporarily) high inflation have been put forward by Sachs
(1989) and Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), who study populist policy cycles, a typical Latin
American type of policymaking. Examples are the experiences of Chile under Allende and Peru
under Garcia (Sachs, 1989), and of Argentina under Peron and Brazil under Sarney (Dornbusch
and Edwards, 1989). The hope of populist policies is to promote development without escalating
class conflict by making use of idle capacity. The actual policies involve reactivation with
redistributive measures and an expansion of aggegate demand. In addition, an appreciation of the
real exchange rate and a reduction in export-promoting measures are used to transfer income
from rich to poor. Effectively, rich owners of primary resources find it harder to sell their
product abroad while poor urban workers see an increase in their real wage. To avoid inflation-
ary pressures and preserve the real value of the real wage and living standards, price controls are
put in force and [he nominal exchange rate is pegged. The extra demand is met through running
down inventories and imports. The exchange rate is defended through selling foreign reserves.
Eventually, the economy runs into bottlenecks as inventories and foreign reserves run out.
Populist policies are thus doomed to fail in the longer run as capital flight and inflation rise
steeply. Speculative attacks on the currency induce a huge depreciatíon of the exchange rate,
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both in nominal and in real terms, and further fuel inflation. As a by-product there is an
increasing degree of dollarisation, which erodes the base for inflationary taxation and requires
the government to push up inflation even further in order to meet its expenses. The main lesson
from these studies is that Latin American societies have, in contrast to the more corporatist
societies of Northern Europe, a lot of social unrest and inequality which provide fertile grounds
for populist policies. In a sense, this provides an complementary explanation to the one put
forward in sec[ions 2 and 3 of why societies with a large degree of inequality eventually end up
with high inflation.
The theory on "wars of attrition" between social groups (Alesina and Drazen, 1991)
might explain why in reality stabilisation programmes are delayed so frequently, despite the fact
that all parties in a social conflict find stabilisation desirable. Groups are waiting each other out,
until one concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. Alesina and Drazen (1991)
show that the higher the degree of polarisation, the later is the expected date of stabilisation.
Also, policies that reduce the costs associated with inflation may be counterproductive as they
make it more difficult to reach agreement on undertaking painful steps to fight inflation itself.
Countries may need to suffer considerable inflation before fiscal policies are adopted that are
consistent with a stable price level (Drazen and Grilli, 1990).
5. Cross-country evidence on intlation, inequality and government debt
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) depict average producer price inflation (PPI6085) against income
inequality around 1960 (M60) for a set of 23 democracies and 43 non-democracies, respectively
(for the data, see also the appendix to this chapter).' Since data on the distribution of nominal
wealth are not available for a wide cross-section of countries, the inequality measure is based on
data for the distribution of income per head, taken from Alesina and Rodrik (1991). The measure
of inequality is given by M-1-(medianlmean).5 In a society with an unequal distribution of
incomes mean income exceeds median income, so the measure of inequality M lies between zero
and one.
Figure I(a) suggests for all democracies, except Israel, a strong link between inflation
and inequality. For example, countries such as Columbia (M60-0.550; PPI6085-0.1703) and
' Unfortunately, no distribution data were available on a comparative basis for the democratic
countries Belgium, Greece and Switzerland.
5 If the quintile in which the median income falls eams a percentage x of total income and all
members of the quintile eam the same income, this measure of inequality can be proxied by M-1-(x~20).
This measure is the one that is closest to the measure used in section 3, (dp dM).
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Figure 1: Average producer price intlation 1960-1985 versus income inequality around 1960.
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Costa Rica (M60-0.440; PP[6085-0.1309) and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica (M60-0.460;
PP16085-0.1161) combine a high degree of inequality with high inflation rates. Israel, being a
remarkably egalitarian society with very high inflation rates (M60-0.070; PPI6085-0.4565), is
an outlier and was thus excluded. Table 1 presents cross-country regressions of the average
producer and consumer price inflation over the period 1960-1985 on a constant and the measure
of inequality around 1960. In the regressions there is, at [he 5 per cent level, a significantly
positive effect of inequality on inflation. Table 1 also shows, for the same cross-section of
democracies, the results of the regression of average producer price inflation over the period
1980-1985 on a constant and inequality around 1980. These results confirrn the strong positive
association between inflation and inequality found earlier.
Inspection of Figure 1(b) reveils no relationship between producer price inflation and
inequality for our sample of non-democracies. This is confirmed by the results (not reported
here) of regressions of the two measures of inflation on a constant and M60 for the entire
sample and various subsamples. Perhaps, this is not surprising as the model put forward in
sections 2 and 3 applies to democratic countries. Non-democratic countries such as South Africa
t t t
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Table 1: Cross-country regressions for democracies of
intlation on inequality and government debt
IOS
constant M60 M80 D608S JB R' R'
PPI608S 0.041 0.173 - - 2.69 0.49 0.46
(3.93) (4.35)
[4.18] [3.94]
PPI808S 0.011 - 0.424 - 8.01 0.34 0.30
(0.41) (3.18)
[0.41 ] [2.08]
PPI608S' -0.006 0.165 - 0.173 0.61 0.83 0.81
(-0.34) (2.59) (9.80)
(-0.32] [2.04] [8.24]
CPI608S 0.047 0.164 - - 3.25 0.48 0.45
(4.70) (4.27)
[S.II] [3.98J
CPI8085 0.034 - 0.424 - 6.96 0.34 0.31
(1.28) (3.21)
[1.29] [1.98]




1. ~egend: M60 - measure of inequality for 19G0.
M80 - measure of inequalit} for 1980.
PPlxxvy - geometric average of annual inflation rates in producer prices during 19xx-19yy.
CPlxtiyy - geometric average of annual inflation rates in consumer prices during 19xa-19yy.
D6085 - arithmetic average of govemment debt-GDP ratio's during 19fi0-1985.
2. Source: MGO and M80, Alesina and Rodrik (1991).
PPlsxyy. CPlxxyy, Summers and Heston (1988) and OECD Main Economic Indicators
D6085, IMF Intemational Financial Statistics.
3. Note: standard t-ratios are given in round brackets.
t-ratios based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in square brackets.
JB - Jarque-Bera test for nonnality, which is chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis with
two degrees of freedom.
' regressions are with Israel included.
(M60-0.490; PP16085-0.0904), Honduras (M60-0.S2S; PPI608S-0.OS78) and EI Salvador
(M60-0.560; PP1608S-0.0648) are capitalist dictatorships which seem to protect the interests of
rentiers and combine high degrees of inequality with low inflation.
Additional tests for the robustness of the results just discussed are presented in Tables 2
and 3. First, we investigated whether the positive association between (producer price) inflation
and inequality was still preserved when adding variables that proxy for political instability or
polarisation, as suggested by Cukierman et aL (1992). A variety of variables from the dataset of
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Table 2: Robustness of link between intlation and inequality for democratic countries
against adding political instability and polarisation variables
ASSASS CONST CRISES RCOUP RIOT STRIKE
constant 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.039
(3.65) (3.82) (3.20) (3.74) (3.67) (3.65)
[3.57] [3.93] [3.36] [3.95] [3.96] [3.75]
M60 0.168 0.164 0.174 0.173 0.172 0.169
(4.19) (3.93) (3.62) (4.25) (4.20) (4.18)
[3.55] [3.30] [3.20] [3.86] [3.84] [3.64j
JB 2.19 2.17 2.60 2.67 3.05 2.39
RZ 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.50
R O..a6 i~ ;~ 0-,~) 0.]3 0.43 0.45
Rcmarks:
I. Legend: M60 - measure of' inequality for 1960.
ASSASS - number of assassinatíons per million population per year (1960-1985 or subperiod).
CONST - number of constitutional changes (1960-1985 or subperiod).
CRISES - number of government crises per year (1960-1985 or subperiod).
RCOUP - number of revolutions and coups per year (1960-1985 or subsample).
RIOT - number of riots per year (1960-1985 or subperiod).
STRIKE - number of strikes per year 11960-1985 or subperiod).
2. Source: Banks 11979).
3. Note: standard t-ratios are given in round brackets.
t-ratios based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in square brackets.
JB - Jarque-Bera test for normality.
In the regressions for CRISES Jamaica and Venezuela were missing.
Israel is excluded: dependent variable is PP16085.
Table 3: Tests for reverse causation for democracies (dependent variable is M80):
constant M60 PP16080 CP16080 JB R' R'-
0.0679 0.549 -0.222 - 2.57 0.440 0.381
(1.23) (3.29) (-0.273)
[ 1.20] [3.61 ] [-0.230]
0.0763 0.565 - -0.374 2.18 0.444 0.386
(1.35) (3.43) (-0.451)
[1.31] [3.64] [-0.377]
0.0578 ' 0.515 0.0144 - 3.41 0.449 0.393
(1.28) (3.98) (0.035)
[1.73] [6.56] [0.049]




See Remarks Table 1.
~ Ihese regressions are with Israel included.
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Barro and Wolf (1989) was used, such as the average number of assassinations per capita,
constitutional changes, revolutions, revolutions and coups, riots, strikes and crises. For the
democracies, none of these variables tumed out to be significant and none on them were able to
wipe out the strong positive link between inflation and inequality (see Table 2). One reason
might, of course, be that the variables just mentioned are only rough proxies for political
instability and polarisation. In the corresponding regressions for our set of non-democracies the
coefflcients of these proxies generally came out with the predicted theoretical signs and were
close to or significant. As before, inequality was insignificant in explaining inflation for our set
of non-democratic countries. Finally, even though the results have shown a significant positive
link between inflation and inequality at the start of the sample period, these findings do not of
course exclude the possibility that there could be an effect of inflation on inequality. For
example, rich people may have better opportunities to hedge against inflation. Hence, we
subjected our set of democracies to a check on reverse causation by regressing inequality around
1980 on a constant, inequality around 1960 and average inflation between 1960 and 1980, in
order to see whether inflation could explain changes in inequality over the period 1960-1980.
Inequality around 1960 tumed out to be highly significant, while inflation was far from
significant, thus suggesting no effect from inflation on inequality (see Table 3).
The theory put forward in sections 2 and 3 to explain the link between inequality and
inflation is based on the idea that the presence of an outstanding stock of nominal government
debt provides an open invitation for the government to wipe out the real value of its debt
through unanticipated inflation.b To test whether there is empirical evidence for the proposition
that in a democracy both inequality and govemment debt raise inflation' and to see whether the
experience of Israel can be explained, Table 1 also presents the relevant cross-country
regressions for the democratic countries with Israel included. It is remarkable that the
explanatory power of the regressions is much increased, that the effect of inequality on inflation
is almost the same order of magnitude as before and remains significant, and that the ratio of
government debt to GDP exerts a strong and significant additional influence on inflation. The
6 This theory supposes that all countries are forced to pursue discretionary monetary policies.
However, during the eighties some countries made deliberate attempts to shift from discretion to rules.
The tests presented in Table 1 ignore the effects of these attempts. This may not be too bad, since if these
effects were present they would only affect the last few years of the sample. In any case, it is doubtful
whether central banks can commit to rules. Countries with a fairly equal income distribution such as the
Netherlands elect a policy of low inflation. Such a discretionary policy may from an empirical point of
view be indistinguishable from the rules outcome (cf., Rogoft; 1985).
' Equation (12) suggests that there is also a public finance argument for this proposition which says
that a greater need for govemment funds (k-g{-(p-nkl,,) requires more govemment revenues (including
seigniorage) and thus a higher inflation rate (e.g., Mankiw, 1987). 71tis factor is unimportant if debt
service is a small fraction of total govemment spending.
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very high inflation rate of Israel is thus primarily a consequence of its very high ratio of govem-
ment debt to GDP (2.36), so that the negative effect on inflation caused by the egalitarian nature
of Israel's sociery is not sufficient to off-set the positive effect of govemment debt. Conversely,
fairly inegalitarian societies such as Germany or Japan (M60 of 0.315 and 0.210, respectively)
have nevertheless fairly low inflation rates (PP16085 of 0.0379 and 0.0562, respectively) due to
their modest ratio's of govemment debt to GDP (D6085 of 0. I 126 and 0.1030, respectively).
The cross-country regressions for the democratic countries suggest that the difference in
the inflation rates of an egalitarian society for which M is close to zero and an inegalitarian
society for which M is around 0.5 is about eight percentage points. The regressions also suggest
that a rise in the ratio of government debt to GDP by about six percentage points raises inflation
by one percentage point. These stylised empirical facts provide some motivation for the analysis
of sections 2 and 3.
6. Conclusion
Cross-country evidence on a positive link between inflation and income inequality for
democratic countries has been presented. The regressions suggest that the difference in inflation
rates of a country in which all individuals earn the same and a country in which the median
income is half of average income is about eight percentage points. The regressions also suggest
that a rise in the ratio of government debt to GDP by about six percentage points raises inflation
by one percentage point.
These results may be explained by a model in which an unequal dispersion of wealth
sets the political conditions for high inflation and low tax rates. When assets are unequally
distributed in society, the govemment is more likely to represent the interests of the poor and
thus finds it harder to commit itself to a policy of low inflation. When the analysis is extended
to allow for overlapping generations one can show that a society dominated by young people
will elect political parties that are in favour of taxing the elderly by eroding the real value of
their return on accumulated savings and lowering taxes for the population at large.e However,
many countries of the OECD are experiencing a greying of the population so that one migitt
expect lower inflation and higher tax rates in years to come. The ideas put forward in this
chapter apply to democracies, but it is not difficult to extend the argument to non-democratic
e Population and output grow at the rate n. The currently alive (the "old") are alike in all respects and
hold assets. Newly born (the "young") have no assets. Average assets are DA-D~(Itn). If the "old" are in
the majority, n~l and D,~ D~D~, but if the "young" are in the majority, n~l and D,,~DM-O. If the "old"
are in the majority, there is an incentive to shift the burden of raising govemment funds on the minority
by raising taxes and lowering inFlation.
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countries. Populist dictatorships are likely to serve the interests of the working classes and to
induce high inflation rates whilst capitalisi dictatorships are more likely to protect the interests of
rentiers and ensure low inflation rates despite having high degrees of inequality.
The testing of our proposition that inequality causes inflation presupposes a positive
correlation between income and naminal assets holdings. Although comparable cross-section data
on nominal wealth are not available and inflation might affect agents in many other ways, there
are several reasons to motivate the use of income data. First, our argument applies to the tota!
stock of nominal assets, including pension claims (which are higher for agents with higher
income), etc., in as far as these are not fully indexed for inflation. Secondly, in our analysis the
correct measure of the incentive for unanticipated inflation is not the distribution of nominal
wealth as a percentage of total individual wealth, but differences in absolute levels of nominal
wealth across agents. The reason is that the revenues from the inflation tax are handed back to
the population by an equal decrease in non-monetary taxes for each agent.
This chapter has focussed on the political economy of unanticipated ínflation. However,
anticipated inflation also has real effects when wages, pensions and benefits are not fully or not
immediately indexed to the price level and inflation is high. If indexation is easier for high than
for low incomes and the poor do not have the same access to financial instruments as the rich
have to shelter against inflation, inflation may hurt the poor relatively more than the rich. More
inequality then induces less inflation in democratic countries. Conversely, given that indexation
is not perfect especially for the poor, more equality induces more inflation. However, the stylised
facts collected in this chapter do not support this hypothesis. A full analysis of these issues
should allow for the fact that policies to protect the interests of the poor, i.e., indexation of
wages, benefits and pensions, reduce the costs of inflation and induce governments to pursue
policies of higher inflation and lower welfare (e.g., Fischer and Summers, 1989). Also, policies
that reduce the costs associated with inflation may be counterproductive as they make it more
difficult to reach agreement on undertaking painful steps to fight inflation itself. Countries may
need to suffer considerable inflation before fiscal policies are adopted that are consistent with a




Country M60 M80 PPI6085 CP16085 D6085
Australia 0.110 0.125 0.0726 0.0765 0.2749
Canada 0.130 O.IIS 0.0604 0.0612 0.3165
Columbia 0.550 0.325 0.1703 O.1690 0.1154
Costa Rica 0.440 0.340 0.1309 0.1309 0.2422
Denmark 0.060 0.080 0.0790 0.0843 0.1492
Finland 0.230 0.080 0.0839 0.0875 0.0911
France 0.300 0.140 0.0717 0.0759 0.1641
Germany 0.315 0.110 0.0379 0.0416 0.1126
India 0.200 0.185 0.0776 0.0830 0.4535
Israel 0.070 O.110 0.4565 0.4662 2.3599
Italy 0.270 0.165 0.0995 0.1025 0.4685
Jamaica 0.460 0.280 0.1161 O.I252 0.4499
Japan 0.210 0.125 0.0562 0.0667 0.1030
Malaysia 0.2I5 0.305 0.0370 0.0444 0.4447
Netherlands 0.200 0.105 0.0543 0.0580 0.3249
New Zealand 0.160 0.190 0.0886 0.0914 0.5282
Norway 0.075 0.055 0.0661 0.07I3 0.2720
Spain 0.240 0.135 0.1085 O.1136 0.1830
Sri Lanka 0.310 0.395 0.0954 0.0900 0.5926
Sweden 0.130 0.130 0.0712 0.0784 0.2526
U.K. 0.170 0.090 0.0807 0.0849 0.4938
U.S.A. 0.120 0.130 0.0484 0.0530 0.3284
Venezuela 0.200 0.300 0.0711 0.0829 0.0939
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Dntu democrnlic coun(ries - contin:~ec1:
Country PPI6080 CP16080 PPI8085 CP18085
Australia 0.0722 0.0726 0.0745 0.0924
Canada 0.0619 0.0573 0.0548 0.0772
Columbia O.I614 0.1548 0.2065 0.2275
Costa Rica 0.0848 0.081I 0.3355 0.3542
Denmark 0.0834 0.0839 0.0617 0.0857
Finland 0.0860 0.0871 0.0757 0.0893
France 0.0709 0.0708 0.0750 0.0965
Germany 0.0426 0.0423 0.0193 0.0391
India 0.0850 0.0841 0.0484 0.0790
lsrael 0.2284 0.2305 0.8787 0.9550
Italy 0.0939 0.0916 0.1220 0.1473
Jamaica 0.1041 0.1091 0.1653 0.1918
Japan 0.0675 0.0747 0.0122 0.0354
Malaysia 0.0395 0.0395 0.0271 0.064t
Netherlands 0.0619 0.0612 0.0245 0.0453
New Zealand 0.0872 0.0841 0.0943 0.1206
Norway 0.0648 0.0671 0.0714 0.0883
Spain 0.1101 0.1116 0.1019 0.1219
Sri Lanka 0.0968 0.0917 0.0896 0.0833
Sweden 0.0728 0.0733 0.0648 0.0986
U.K. 0.0884 0.0878 0.0502 0.0734
U.S.A. 0.0535 0.0526 0.0280 0.0548
Venezuela 0.0651 0.0675 0.0956 0.1472
Remark: For description and source of variables, see Remarks Table I in the text.
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Data non-democratic countries:
Country M60 PP16085 CPI6085 Country M60 PPI6085 CP16085
Argentina 0.340 0.5732 0.5783 Malawi 0.345 0.0703 0.0702
Bangladesh 0.230 0.0989 0.0995 Mexico 0.445 0.1945 0.1932
Bolivia 0.400 0.4926 0.4961 Morocco 0.615 0.0468 0.0490
Botswana 0.435 0.0866 0.0892 Niger 0.220 0.0578 0.0602
Brazil 0.490 0.5670 0.5610 Nigeria 0.550 0.1069 0.1127
Burma 0.350 0.0378 0.0408 Pakistan 0.225 0.0804 0.0842
Chad 0.230 0.0679 0.0800 Panama 0.310 0.0400 0.0424
Chile 0.400 0.6604 0.6647 Peru 0.585 0.2008 0.2037
Dom. Rep. 0.360 0.0745 0.0824 Philippines 0.400 0.1157 0.1187
Egypt 0.270 0.0812 0.0890 Senegal 0.500 0.0522 0.0561
EI Salvador 0.560 0.0648 0.0716 Sierra Leone 0.545 0.1235 0.1319
Gabon 0.650 0.0819 0.0926 South Africa 0.490 0.0904 0.0922
Guatemala 0.160 0.0657 0.0646 Sudan 0.285 0.1373 0.1410
Honduras 0.525 0.0578 0.0601 Taiwan 0.320 0.0671 0.0676
Hong Kong 0.285 0.0667 0.0635 Tan7ania 0.450 0.0864 0.1039
Indonesia 0.330 0.5224 0.5133 Thailand 0.445 0.0592 0.0580
Iran 0.375 0.0686 0.0747 Trin. 8c Tob. 0.270 0.0685 0.0710
Iraq 0.600 0.0758 0.0828 Tunisia 0.500 0.0659 0.0647
[vory Coast 0.400 0.0699 0.0709 Uganda 0.255 0.1926 0.1996
Kenya 0.560 0.0729 0.0734 Uruguay 0.345 0.5197 0.5276
Korea 0.100 0.1627 0.1614 Zambia 0.445 0.0966 0.1055
Madagascaz 0.435 0.0939 0.0969
Remarks:
For description and source of variables, see Remarks Table I in the text.
Abbreviations~. Dom. Rep. - Dominican Republic. Tria B: Tob. - Trinidad and Tobago.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschift bestaat uit twee delen. In deel A, hoofdstukken 2 tot en 5, worden
wisselkoersbanden bestudeerd, zowel vanuit een theoretisch als een empirisch oogpunt. Het
empirische werk is geconcentreerd op het Europese Monetaire Stelsel ( EMS), hetgeen een van
de meest succesvolle en best bestudeerde voorbeelden is van regimes van beperkte
wisselkoersflexibiliteit. Het theoretische werk is vooral geconcentreerd op het bestuderen van de
stabiliteit van belangrijke economische variabelen, zoals werkgelegenheid, prijzen en rentevoeten
onder een regime van wisselkoersbanden. Verder komt daarin de vraag aan de orde of een
wisselkoersband wenselijk kan zijn vanuit het oogpunt van macro-economische stabilisatie. Deel
B, hoofdstuk 6, bestudccrt. vanuit een politiek-economisch model, hoe een ongelijke verdeling
van nominale schuldtiiels intlatie kan veroorzaken.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een Monte Carlo analyse gebruikt om drie
wisselkoersbandmodellen met elkaar te vergelijken in hun capaciteit om bepaalde gestileerde
statistische feiten, gevonden voor Duitse Mark wisselkoersen binnen het EMS, te reproduceren.
We gebruiken wekelijkse waamemingen voor de periode van januari 1987 tot en met augustus
1990. Deze periode is gekozen omdat gedurende deze periode geen (belangrijke)
koersherschikkingen hebben plaatsgevonden terwijl twee van de modellen een betrouwbare
wisselkoersband veronderstellen. De modellen zijn het standaard target zone model van Krugman
(1991), een model dat interventies binnen de band (intramarginal interventies) combineert met
interventies op de grenzen van de band (inframarginale interventies), en een model met
onvervulde verwachtingen van herschikkingen. In vergelijking met corresponderende dollar
wisselkoersen van EMS munten, blijken veranderingen in de Duitse Mark wisselkoersen veel
sterkere niet-normaliteit te tonen, hetgeen endogeen gegenereerd kan worden door de twee
laatstgenoemde modellen, en iets meer conditionele heteroskedasticiteit, hetgeen gelijktijdig
gereproduceerd kan worden door het model dat intra- en inframarginale interventies combineert.
Deze exercitie suggereert echter ook een meer algemene conclusie: namelijk' dat de consensus
over de beperkte bruikbaarheid van wisselkoersband modellen voor het beschrijven van EMS
wisselkoersgedrag mede veroorzaakt wordt doordat in de literatuur het zoeken naar zeer
specifieke nie[-lineariteiten in de relatie tussen wisselkoers en 'fundamental' weinig heeft
opgeleverd. Als men het standaardmodel echter ook maar iets uitbreidt, dan kan men bij wijze
van spreken bijna elke vorm van niet-lineariteit tussen wisselkoers en fundamental produceren.
Daarom lijkt het zoeken naar specifieke niet-lineariteiten weinig informatief Het lijkt beter om
het nut van wisselkoersband modellen te ondeaoeken door meer realistische aannamen te maken
over het interventiebeleid en de implicaties voor de stalistische eigenschappen van
wisselkoersveranderingen te vergelijken met wat in de data gevonden wordt.
Hoofdstuk 3 volgt een meer eclectische benadering over het onderliggende structurele
model voor de empirische analayse. [n navolging van Rose en Svensson (1991), Svensson
(1991), en Lindberg, Svensson en Sóderlind (1991), worden verwachte veranderingen geschat
van de Franse Franc en de Italiaanse Lire ten opzichte van de Duitse Mark, zowel onconditi-
oneel als conditioneel op het optreden van een herschikking. De literatuur wordt op twee
manieren uitgebreid. Ten eerste worden uitgebreidere specificaties voor de regressie analyse
gehanteerd. De eclectische benadering vindt hierin zijn weerslag, dat de specificaties niet strikt
gebaseerd zijn op een onderliggend structureel model maar op kwalitatieve predicties van de
literatuur over wisselkoersbanden. Ten tweede wordt de veronderstelling van ongedekte
rentepariteit losgelaten en worden tevens modellen voor de risicopremie geschat. Gebruikmakend
van de schattingen voor de verwachte wisselkcersverandering binnen de band en de geschatte
risicopremie, kan men schattingen contrueren voor de verwachte totale wisselkoersverandering,
de verwachte herschikking en de verwachte devaluatie van de wisselkoers, door aanpassingen
van het renteverschil met Duitsland. Deze aanpassingen zijn niet triviaaL
Uit hei standaard target zone model volgt dat de theoretische verdeling van de
wisselkoers binnen de band U-vormig is, met relatief veel kansmassa geconcentreerd bij de
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grenzen. Bertola en Caballero (1992) laten echter zien dat voor EMS wisselkcersen de
empirische verdeling van de kansmassa geconcentreerd is binnen de grenzen van de band,
waarbij zij zich baseren op een waamemingsperiode die loopt tot eind 1987. Zij geven een
verklaring hiervoor die gebaseerd is op een model met herhaalde herschikkingen van de band. In
hoofdstuk 4 laten we echter zien dat voor de periode ]987-1991 de empirische verdeling van
EMS wisselkoersen nog steeds geconcentreerd is binnen de band, ondanks het feit dat de banden
een stuk betrouwbaarder zijn gedurende deze periode, zoals blijkt uit renteverschiHen met
Duitstand. Hiervoor bieden we een alternatieve verklaring binnen een model dat in twee
belangrijke opzichten meer realistisch is dan de meeste andere wisselkoersbandmodellen,
namelijk er is sprake van een zekere mate van prijsstarheid en er zijn intramarginale interventies.
Beide uitbreidingen zijn noodzakelijk voor de verklaring die we geven.
Hoofdstuk 5 gebruikt het model van hoofdstuk 4 om te ondeaoeken welke effecten een
wisselkoersband heeft op de stabiliteit van werkgelegenheid, prijzen, rentevoeten en nominale en
reële wisselkoersen, in vergelijking met andere wiselkoersregimes, zoals een volledig vrije of
vaste wisselkoers, of de meer algemene 'unrestricted dirty float'. Verder wordt, vanuit het
oogpunt van de macro-economische stabilisatiepolitiek, de wenselijkheid van wisselkoersbanden
ondeaocht in vergelijking met andere wisselkoersregimes. Deze kwestie is moeilijk te
onderzoeken in de context van de standaardmodellen die koopkrachtpariteit veronderstellen,
zodat de reële wisselkoers vast is en daarom geen effect heefr op de vraag en de
werkgelegenheid. De autoriteiten maken een optimale afweging tussen de stabiliteit van
werkgelegenheid en consumentenprijzen. Een 'unrestricted dirty float' is het limietgeval van een
wisselkoersband als de bandbreedte naar oneindig gaat. De vraag wat de optimale bandbreedte is
in een 'first-best' wereld, is nog steeds niet opgelost, hoewel we met behulp van onze simulaties
geen gevallen hebben gevonden waarbij een wisselkoersband een lager welvaartsverlies gaf dan
de optimale 'unrestricted dirty float'. In een wereld met restricties op de accommodatiegraad van
het geldaanbod binnen een band, kan het voordelig zijn om een eindige bandbreedte op te
leggen, afhankelijk van het relatieve gewicht dat de beleidsmakers toekennen aan prijsstabiliteit.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een theoretisch verband ondeaocht tussen ongelijkheid en inflatie.
In een democratie, waarin de meerderheid van de bevolking arm is, zal een regering worden
gekozen die de belangen van de armen behartigt. Dus naarmate overheidsschuld ongelijker
verdeeld is over de bevolking, zal de overheid een sterkere prikkel hebben om door middel van
een onverwachte inflatie de reële waarde van de schuld uit te hollen, om daarmee een
herverdeling tot stand te brengen van de rijken naar de armen. Dit wordt geïllustreerd in een
simpel model, waarbinnen een hogere overheidsschuld en een meer ongelijke verdeling ervan
een hogere inflatie veroorzaken. In de empirische analyse wordt inderdaad een significant
positíef verband gevonden tussen (inkomens) ongelijkheid en inflatie voor een groep van ruim
twintig democra[ische landen, terwijl voor een groep van ruim veertig niet-democratische landen
geen enkel verband tussen inflatie en ongelijkheid wordt gevonden. Deze bevindingen blijven
onveranderd voor verschillende toetsen voor robuustheid. Hoewel overheidsschuld de enige
nominale titel is in het model, is de prikkel voor een onverwachte inflatie in principe aanwezig
voor elk type nominale titel dat ongelijk verdeeld is over de kiezerspopulatie.
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